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INTRODUCTION

T is a bedrock principle of American law that reprehensible
Iproportionate
conduct should be punished and that the punishment should be
to the crime. This, however, does not always come
1

to pass. On occasion, both our civil and criminal justice systems
mete out disproportionately severe punishments.2
In the civil justice system, disproportionate punishments can
take the form of excessive punitive damages. Punitive damages are
awarded not to compensate the plaintiff, but to punish the defendant for wrongful conduct and to deter the defendant and others
from perpetrating such conduct again. 3 In recent years, punitive

1 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) ("The principle that a punishment
should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in
common-law jurisprudence [as far back as the Magna Carta in 1215]."). Notable discussions of the idea that punishment should be proportionate to the crime can be
found in Cesare Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments 73-76 (Jane Grigson trans.,
Marsilio Publishers 1964) (1764); Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation in A Bentham Reader 121-33 (Mary Peter Mack ed., 1969)
(1789); H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 25 (1968); Andrew Von Hirsch,
Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments 66-76 (1976).
2 See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (finding a $2 million punitive
damages verdict for selling a repainted car as new to be disproportionate); Helm, 463
U.S. at 303 (finding a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
for the commission of a seventh nonviolent property felony to be disproportionate).
3 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,350 (1974) ("[Punitive damages] are
not compensation for injury .... [T]hey are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence."). For an economic
perspective on deterrence and punishment in the context of punitive damages, see A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shaven, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1998). For a broader overview of the numerous legal questions
that punitive damages raise, see Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.11 (2d ed. 1993).
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damages verdicts have skyrocketed in both frequency and amount. 4
As a result, courts increasingly have been inundated with appeals
that punitive damages verdicts are disproportionate and hence
should be struck down. 5 Perhaps more obviously, criminal defendants also claim that they have been punished disproportionately.
Putting aside the distinct (and perhaps more contentious) issue of
proportionality in death-penalty cases,6 criminal proportionality
4 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing. As recently as a decade ago, the largest award of punitive damages affirmed by an
appellate court in a products liability case was $250,000 .... Since then, awards more
than 30 times as high have been sustained on appeal." (citation omitted)); John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 Va. L. Rev.
139, 139 (1986) ("In my view, punitive damages are out of control. Certainly recent
awards are unprecedented in both incidence and amount."). But see Theodore
Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Punitive Awards After BMW, a New Capping System,
and the Reported Opinion Bias, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 387, 417 ("No credible evidence
supports the claim that punitive damages are awarded frequently, that when they are
awarded they are unrelated to compensatory damages, or that punitive damages are
systematically awarded in inappropriate cases.").
s There are two different kinds of appeals defendants can make to challenge excessive punitive damages verdicts. First, defendants can request that the trial court order
remittitur (that is, reduction) of the jury's verdict. The trial court has the power to
conclude that the evidence does not support the size of the punitive damages verdict
assessed by the jury or that the verdict is simply excessive. Having found the amount
of damages to be too high, the trial court can reduce the damages to a permissible
level. The plaintiff then has the option to accept the court's assessment of the damages or to have a new trial. In the federal system and in many states, if a trial court
declines to grant remittitur the defendant can appeal the verdict to an appellate court,
contending that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant remittitur. See
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415,436 (1996). See generally James C.
Lopez, Comment, Appellate Control of Excessive Jury Verdicts Since Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities: From Nisi Prius Courts to "Gasperini Hearings," 66 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 1323 (1998). The second way in which a defendant can challenge a punitive
damages verdict is to claim that the verdict is so grossly excessive that it violates the
Constitution's guarantee of due process. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 562-63. It is this second method that will be the focus of this Note.
6 This Note deals only with the Supreme Court's proportionality review of excessive
prison sentences and does not broach the even more complicated topic of proportionality review in capital punishment cases. The Supreme Court has recognized that
"death is ... different" and in doing so has required greater procedural safeguards in
capital cases. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). The Court has
repeatedly affirmed that in capital cases the punishment must be proportionate to the
crime. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (finding a death sentence for
felony-murder to be disproportionate when the defendant neither killed, attempted to
kill, nor intended' to kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (finding the
death penalty to be a disproportionate punishment for the crime of rape of an adult
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claims usually involve the question of whether a prison sentence is
too long for a given crime.7
Although the Supreme Court has on occasion discussed the law
of excessive criminal punishments when deciding punitive damages
cases,8 the Court has nevertheless developed two distinct sets of jurisprudence.9 In the excessive criminal punishment area, after a
long and tumultuous history,10 the Court has pronounced that successful proportionality challenges to criminal punishments will be
exceedingly rare.11 Moreover, the Court's current test to determine
if a criminal punishment is excessive allows lower courts to dispose
of such claims without conducting rigorous review. 12 Conversely,
the Court recently struck down a punitive damages award as excessive13 and delineated a multi-factored test for lower courts to utilize
in assessing the proportionality of other punitive damages verdicts.14 This multi-factored proportionality test is vague and gives
lower courts leeway to strike down punitive damages awards as
they see fit. 15 It thus appears that the Supreme Court has not only
analyzed excessive criminal punishment claims separately from excessive punitive damages verdicts, but it has also promulgated
different levels of proportionality review for the two areas. Strinwoman); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality
of the death penalty but noting that the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the crime). However, in light of recent decisions upholding the death
penalty for felony-murder (Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)), minors over the
age of sixteen (Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)), and the mentally retarded
(Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)), at least one scholar contends that the Supreme Court has neglected its duty to conduct rigorous proportionality review in
capital cases. See Michael Mello, Executing Rapists: A Reluctant Essay on the Ethics
of Legal Scholarship, 4 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 129, 154 (1997).
7 For a discussion of other proportionality challenges to criminal and civil punishments, such as objections to multiple punishments for the same offense, see Nancy J.
King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101 (1995).
8 See infra note 100 and accompanying text, discussing Justice O'Connor's use of a
criminal proportionality test in the punitive damages context.
9 See Part I, infra.
10
See infra Part I.A, discussing the Court's key decisions in the area of excessive
criminal punishments.
11 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
l 2 See infra notes 143-57 and accompanying text.
13 SeeBMW ofN. Am. v. Gore,517U.S. 559,574-75 (1996).
14
See id. at 574-85.
15 See infra notes 174-201 and accompanying text.
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gent proportionality review is afforded to punitive damages verdicts while curt proportionality analysis is conducted for criminal
punishment cases.
Affording greater proportionality review to punitive damages
verdicts than to criminal punishments ,initially appears to make
sense: Criminal punishments are determined by legislatures and
hence should be struck down reluctantly, while punitive damages
verdicts are awarded by randomly selected juries and hence should
be entitled to less deference. Two lines of thought, however, cast
doubt on the validity of this conclusion.
First, a simple hierarchical argument suggests that subjecting a
defendant to mcarceration is more serious than forcing a defendant
to pay punitive damages. 16 In its death-penalty jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has recognized that deprivations of life are entitled
to more protection than deprivations of liberty. If life is more important than liberty, it stands to reason that liberty in tum may be
more important than property. Criminal sentences amount to deprivations of liberty, while punitive damages awards are only
deprivations of property. Given that incarceratmg a defendant is
more serious than forcing him to pay punitive damages, more rigorous proportionality review should be afforded to excessive
criminal sentences.
Second, a more complicated (and more compelling) political
process argument suggests that criminal punishments should be
subject to more rigorous proportionality review.17 Political process
theory posits that courts should abstam from meddling in legislative matters uuless there has been a failure in the political process.18
In the case of excessive criminal punishments there often has been
such a failure. Criminals are consistently the most reviled group in
American politics, and legislators compete to be the toughest on
crime.19 Given the "tough on crime" rhetoric pervading our disSee infra Part IV.B.
See infra notes 240-68 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 228--39 and accompanying text, explaining political process theory.
19 For a recent example, see James Dao, Schumer and D'Amato Try to Out-Tough
Each Other on Crime, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1998, at Bl. At the same time that
"tough on crime" rhetoric has led to stiffer penalties on the legislative front, it has
also led to fewer commutations by executives. See Susan E. Martin, Commutation of
Prison Sentences: Practice, Promise, and Limitation, 29 Crime & Delinq. 593, 609-10
(1983) (concluding that where "tough on crime" rhetoric was prevalent, commuta16
17
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course and the fact that there is no powerful lobby fighting for reasonable criminal sentences,20 the political process cannot be
counted on to remedy disproportionate punishments.21 Conversely,
the legislative process can and does successfully deal with the problem of excessive punitive damages awards. 22 Those who are likely
to be the victims of punitive damages, such as large corporations,
have the resources to lobby for limitations on punitive damages.
This access to the political process is the reason why legislatures all
across the couutry have considered and adopted a plethora of laws
limiting punitive damages verdicts through caps, or even banning
punitive damages altogether.23 Since the political process can effectively deal with excessive punitive damages verdicts but not with
disproportionate criminal punishments, it would make more sense

tions decreased). One need look no further than the political brouhaha that erupted
over President Clinton's decision to grant clemency to fourteen Puerto Rican nationalists (some would say terrorists) to understand the political pressure not to grant
clemency. See Charles Babington, Puerto Rican Nationalists Freed From Prison,
Wash. Post, Sept 11, 1999, at A2. Additionally, "tough on crime" rhetoric has infected
the federal judicial confirmation process. Recently, the full Senate rejected a federal
judicial nominee because he was insufficiently supportive of the death penalty. See
Charles Babington & Joan Biskupic; Senate Rejects Judicial Nominee, Wash. Post,
Oct. 6, 1999, at Al.
20
Of course, there are groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, that do
stand up against disproportionate criminal punishments. These groups, however, do
not constitute an effective lobby capable of challenging the "tough on crime" discourse that pervades American politics. See infra notes 262-69 and accompanying
text, explaining how the political process is not equipped to deal with claims of disproportionate prison sentences.
21
See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 1, 20 (1996) ("A lot of constitutional theory has been shaped by
the idea ... that constitutional law should aim to protect groups that find it hard or
impossible to protect themselves through the political process. If ever such a world
existed, the universe of criminal suspects is it"); see also DavidS. Mackey, Rationality Versus Proportionality: Reconsidering the Constitutional Limits on Criminal
Sanctions, 51 Tenn. L. Rev. 623, 643-44 n.126 (1984) (recognizing that public animosity toward prisoners prevents their rights from being adequately protected by the
legislative process).
22
See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 614-19 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (cataloging numerous recently enacted or proposed laws designed to limit
punitive damages); Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice Through
National Punitive Damages Refonn, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1573, 1589 (1997) ("Forty-six
states either have prohibited punitive damages or have enacted legislation aimed at
reducing their frequency and size."); see also infra Part IV.C.l.
23
See P~ce, supra note 22, at 1589.
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for the judiciary to exert its countermajoritarian weight24 in the
criminal pwrishment area. Under political process theory, therefore, the Supreme Court has its proportionality jurisprudence
backwards.
Part I of this Note will review the Supreme Court's major decisions m the areas of excessive criminal punishments and punitive
damages. Part II will then explain that the Court's most recent decisions-BMW of North America v. Gore,25 in which the Court
struck down a punitive damages verdict as excessive, and Harmelin
v. Michigan,26 in which the Court rejected a claim that a criminal
punishment was disproportionate to the offense-announce more
stringent proportionality review of punitive damages awards than
of criminal punishments. Part III will review lower court decisions
following Harmelin and BMW and demonstrate that lower courts
have interpreted Harmelin to afford virtually no proportionality
protection against excessive criminal punishments, while simultaneously interpreting BMW to require significant proportionality
review of punitive damages verdicts. Part IV will first briefly argue
that deprivations of liberty (criminal punishments) should be entitled to more rigorous judicial review than deprivations of property
(punitive damages awards). Part IV will then explore political
process theory: the idea that courts should be reluctant to enter
into the fray unless there has been a failure in the political process.
Finally, this Note will conclude that the Supreme Court's proportionality jurisprudence is backwards. Instead of affording greater
protection against excessive punitive damages verdicts, the Court
should concern itself with ensuring that criminal punishments are
not disproportionate.

24 For the classic depiction of the countermajoritarian difficulty, see Alexauder M.
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962). Although the idea that judicial review is
countermajoritarian has pervaded the discourse, it is not universally accepted. See,
e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale
L.J. 1013, 1050-51 (1984).
25 517 u.s. 559 (1996).
26 501 u.s. 957 (1991).
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I. THE SUPREME COURT'S PROPORTIONALITY JURISPRUDENCE
A. Proportionality Review of Excessive Prison Sentences

A member of the Court first suggested that an excessively long
criminal sentence could violate the Constitution in O'Neil v. Vermont. 27 O'Neil was convicted of multiple counts of selling
intoxicating liquor without authority, for which he faced a possible
sentence of fifty-four years of hard labor. While a majority of the
Court declined to hear O'Neil's appeal, Justice Stephen Field argued in dissent that a fifty-four year sentence for selling liquor
without authority was excessive and hence cruel and unusual in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.28 Specifically, Justice Field
stated that the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
clause prevents punishments that inflict torture as well as "all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly
disproportioned to the offences charged. "29
Eighteen years after O'Neil, in Weems v. United States,30 four of
the six participating Justices concluded that a punishment was disproportionate and violative of the Eighth Amendment_l1 Weems, a
public official in the Philippine~, was convicted of falsifying an official public document.32 For this seemingly minor offense, Weems
was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment and subjected to hard
and painfullabor.33 Additionally, after his release, Weems was forbidden from becoming a parent, administering property, voting, or
holding office; he was also sentenced to a life of surveillance.34 In
finding this extremely punitive sentence to violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,35
the Weems Court noted that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense." 36
144 u.s. 323 (1892).
See id. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting). The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
29 O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting).
30 217 u.s. 349 (1910).
31 See id. at 382.
32 See id. at 357.
33 See id. at 358, 363--Q4.
34 See id. at 364--Q5.
35 See id. at 382.
36 Id. at 367.
27

28
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Seventy years later, in Rummel v. Estelle, 31 the Supreme Court
backtracked from Weems and upheld a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for a recidivist who had
committed three nonviolent property felonies involving less than
$230.38 The Rummel Court concluded that "one could argue without fear of contradiction ... [that] the length of the sentence
actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative."39
The Rummel majority did, however, stop short of completely abdicating judicial supervision of states' power to punish offenders. The
Court noted in a footnote that a proportionality principle might
come into play in extreme cases such as "if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment."40
Less than two years later, in Hutto v. Davis, 41 the Court reaffirmed Rummel by issuing a per curiam opinion upholding a fortyyear sentence for possession with intent to distribute and distribution of approximately nine ounces of marijuana. 42 Once again, the
Court noted in a footnote that proportionality review might be
proper in extreme cases.43 Nevertheless, the per curiam opinion reiterated that judicial review of prison sentences should be
exceedingly rare because of the difficulty of comparing sentences
and the need to avoid the imposition of the subjective views of individual Justices.44
Despite the Court's admonitions in Davis and Rummel that proportionality challenges to prison sentences should be exceedingly
rare,45 the Court itself struck down a sentence as excessive only one
year after Hutto v. Davis. In Solem v. Helm,46 the Court overturned
445 u.s. 263 (1980).
See id. at 265-66.
39 Id. at 274. The decision in Weems, which seemed to contradict this statement, was
distinguished because of the unusual conditions accompanying Weems's imprisonment. See id. at 274.
40
Id. at 274 n.ll.
41 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
42 See id. at 370-75.
43 See id. at 374 n.3.
44 See id. at 373-74.
45
See id. at 373; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272.
46 463 U.S. 277 (1983). The Helm majority was composed of Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and John Paul Stevens. See
id. at 279. Justice Blackmun had previously voted with the majorities in Rummel v.
Estelle and Hutto v. Davis. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 264; Hutto, 454 U.S. at 370.
'SI
38
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a punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
for the commission of a seventh nonviolent offense.47 The Court
concluded that the punishment was disproportionate because the
length of the sentence was excessive.48 Writing for the Helm major. ity, Justice Lewis Powell first made clear that the principle that a
punishment should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted
in our nation's history. 49 Having found that the punishment must be
proportionate to the crime, the Court proceeded to promulgate a
three-part objective test to determine whether prison sentences
were disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment.so
Justice Powell stated that courts should look first "to the gravity of
the offense and the harshness of the penalty."51 Second, courts
should "compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction."s2 If more serious crimes are subject to the same
or less serious penalties, Justice Powell explained, then that is evidence that the penalty is disproportionate.s3 Fmally, courts should
judge proportionality by "compar[ing] the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."S4 The majority did not mention that the Rummel and Davis Courts had
explicitly rejected these types of "objective" criteria as too difficult
to implement and for too easily disguising Justices' subjective opinions.5s Instead, Justice J:>owell explained that there are widely
shared views as to the seriousness of different crimes,s6 and while it
may be hard to draw a line between sentences of different lengths,

47 See Helm, 463 U.S. at 279. Helm had been convicted, on separate occasions, of
three third-degree burglaries, obtaining money under false pretenses, grand larceny,
driving while intoxicated, and passing a no-account check. See id. at 279-81.
48
See id. at 303.
49 See id. at 284. Justice Powell contended that Weems v. United States endorsed this
proportionality principle. See id. at 286-87.
sa See id. at 290-92.
51 Id. at 290-91.
52 Id. at 291.
53 See id.
54 Id. at 291-92.
55 See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 (1982) (per curiam) ("[T]he excessiveness of one prison term as compared to another is invariably a subjective
determination, there being no clear way to make 'any constitutional distinction between one term of years and a shorter or longer term of years."') (quoting Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275 (1980)).
56 See Helm, 463 U.S. at 292.
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courts are frequently called upon to draw these types of difficult
lines.57
Applying its three-part proportionality test, the Court found that
Hehn's sentence of life imprisonp1ent without the possibility of parole was disproportionate.58 While recognizing that Hehn was a
recidivist, the Court found that the gravity of Hehn's crime was
minimal.59 An intrajurisdictional comparison of sentences imposed
in South Dakota demonstrated that the other crimes which carried
mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole were more serious felonies, including murder, second and
third convictions for treason, first-degree manslaughter, firstdegree arson, and kidnapping. 60 Finally, an interjurisdictional comparison showed that only one other state (Nevada) permitted such
a harsh punishment, and even there the sentence of life without parole was not mandatory and had never been meted out for such a
minor offense.61
In announcing that punishment must be proportionate to the
crime and in finding the length of Helm's sentence to be disproportionate, the Helm Court appeared to depart dramatically from
Rummel's suggestion that the length of criminal sentences is a matter of legislative prerogative.62 Contrary to Rummel-which
suggested that successful proportionality challenges to criminal
punishments would be rare (and possibly nonexistent)-Helm
seemed to suggest that the Eighth Amendment contains a rigorous
proportionality requirement. The existence of this rigorous proportionality review did not last long.
Eight years after Helm, the Court retreated from its conclusion
that prison sentences must be proportionate to the crime. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 63 a fractured majority, composed of Chief Justice

See id. at 294.
See id. at 303.
59 See id. at 296. The Court remarked that passing a no-account check was "one of
the most passive felonies a person could commit." Id. (internal qnotation marks omitted).
oo See id. at 298.
61 See id. at 299-300.
62 See id. at 307-10 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of disregarding
Rummel's holding that the length of a sentence of imprisonment is a matter of legislative and not judicial discretion).
57

58

63

501 u.s. 957 (1991).
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William Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin
Scalia, William Kennedy, and David Souter, rejected Ronnie Harmelin's claim that a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole was disproportionate for the crime of possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine.64 A majority of the Court
was unable, however, to agree upon how proportionality review
should be conducted.
Justice Scalia, writing only for himself and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, argued that the Court's conclusion in Solem v. Helm
that the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality guarantee
was "simply wrong." 65 Justice Scalia posited that as a historical matter the Eighth Amendment was only intended to prohibit cruel and
unusual modes of punishment, not disproportionately long sentences.66 He also criticized Helm's three-part test for determining
disproportionate punishments, and argued that Helm's first prong
was improper because it is too difficult for judges to assess objectively whether the severity of the sanction is disproportionate to
the gravity of the offense.67 Justice Scalia found the same fault with
Helm's second prong, which required an intrajurisdictional comparison between the defendant's sentence and the sentence
imposed on similar defendants in that jurisdiction; he concluded
that there is no objective standard to judge if some offenses in a jurisdiction are more grave than others. 68 Finally, Justice Scalia
balked at Helm's third prong, which required an interjurisdictional
comparison of the actual punishment to potential sentences the defendant could have received in other jurisdictions. Justice Scalia
contended that a state is entitled to criminalize and severely punish
behavior that other states would punish mildly or not at all. 69
While Justice Scalia wrote the lead opinion in Harmelin, it was
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion-joined by Justices O'Connor
and Souter-that was actually controlling. At the outset, Justice
See id. at 996; id. at 1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 965 (Opinion of Scalia, J.).
66
See id. at 966-85 (Opinion of Scalia, J.).
67
See id. at 987-88 (Opinion of Scalia, J.). Moreover, even if it were possible for
judges to accnrately assess the severity of the punishment and the gravity of the offense, Justice Scalia argued that such decisions are properly in the province of the
legislature and not the courts. See id. (Opinion of Scalia, J.).
68 See id. at 988-89 (Opinion of Scalia, J.).
69 See id. at 989-90 (Opinion of Scalia, J.).
64

65
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Kennedy recognized that the Court's proportionality decisions
"have not been clear or consistent in all respects."70 Justice Kennedy nevertheless tried to reconcile the Court's past opinions by
concluding that the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has
recognized a "narrow proportionality principle. "71 More specifically, Justice Kennedy took a step back from Helm's conclusion
that the crime and sentence must be proportionate, concluding instead that the Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences
that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.72 Hence, strict proportionality between the crime and the sentence is not required. 73
Justice Kennedy also backtracked from Helm's three-part proportionality test, contending that none of the prongs themselves
was intended to be dispositive.74 Justice Kennedy stated that courts
should still undertake Helm's first prong by considering whether
the crime and the accompanying sentence created an inference of
gross disproportionality.75 However, if the court did not perceive
gross disproportionality between the crime and the sentence then
the second and third prongs of the Helm test-the intrajurisdictional
and interjurisdictional comparisons of comparable punishmentsneed not be undertaken. 76 According to Justice Kennedy, this
framework explained Weems, Rummel, Davis, and Helm: Intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analysis was undertaken in Weems
and Helm to validate an initial inference of gross disproportionality,n while no comparative analysis was undertaken in Rummel and
Davis because there was no initial inference of gross disproportionality.78 Applying this test to Harmelin's case, Justice Kennedy
concluded that the magnitude of Harmelin's crime was so great that
the punishment could not give rise to an inference of disproportionality.79 Without such an inference, Harmelin's sentenc~ could be

Id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
72 See id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
74 See id. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75 See id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
76 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
77 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70

11
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upheld without conducting intrajurisdictional or interjurisdictional
comparisons of similar crimes and sentences.80
Justices Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, and
John Paul Stevens dissented in Harmelin, concluding that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the
possession of over 650 grams of cocaine was disproportionate.81
Justice White's dissent82 first took issue with Justice Scalia's conclusion that the Eighth Amendment did not require proportionate
punishments. Justice White argued that the history of the Eighth
Amendment and the Court's interpretation of it in cases like
Weems, Helm, and a number of death-penalty cases83 demonstrated
that the Eighth Amendment affords a proportionality guarantee.84
Justice White further criticized Justice Scalia for failing to take account of the hypothetical in Rummel in which a legislature makes
overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole.85
Justice White also sharply disagreed with Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion, noting that "Justice Kennedy's abandonment of the
second and third factors set forth in Solem makes any attempt at an
objective proportionality analysis futile." 86 Justice White contended
that intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparisons of simi-

See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 1027 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1028 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82 Justice White's dissent was joined only by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Justice
Marshall wrote a separate dissent in which he agreed (for the most part) with Justice
White's dissent. See id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83 Justice White cited Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 187 (1976) (upholding the
constitutionality of the death penalty but noting that the punishment must not be
grossly out of proportion to the crime), Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)
(striking down the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman because it was
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime), and Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 7'i!l2, 801 (1982) (striking down a felony-murder death sentence as disproportionate for a getaway driver who had a minor role in the crime and had not intended to
kill the victim). Justice White pointed out that it would make no sense to hold that the
words "cruel and unusual" afford proportionality protection for death sentences but
not for other types of sentences. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1013-14 (White, J.,
dissenting).
84 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009-16 (White, J., dissenting).
as See id. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 1020 (White, J., dissenting).
80

81
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lar crimes and sentences are the only way for judges to compare
the gravity of the offense with the severity of the punishment.87
Piecing together the various Harmelin opinions, it is clear that
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion is controlling.88 Six other Justices supported Justice Kennedy's conclusion that a narrow
proportionality guarantee exists.89 Additionally, a majority of the
Court supported Justice Kennedy's position that Helm's intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses should not be conducted
in all but the rarest instances.90 While Justice Kennedy's concurrence recognized that a proportionality guarantee does exist, his
opinion suggested that successful proportionality challenges to
criminal punishments would be exceedingly rare. 91 Thus, after a
century of conflicting decisions, it appears that while proportional~n See id. at 1021 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued that intrajurisdictional
and interjurisdictional comparisons proved that Harmelin's life sentence without the
possibility of parole was disproportionate. The only crimes receiving comparable punishment in Michigan were first-degree murder and distribution of more than 650
grams of narcotics, both of which are more serious offenses than Harmelin's crime.
Additionally, Harmelin would not have been punished as harshly in any other state in
the nation. See id. at 1025-27 (White, J., dissenting).
83 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Van Winrow, 951 F.2d 1069, 1071 n.2
(9th Cir. 1991) (applying Marks to the Harmelin decision); Les A. Martin, Note, Harmelin v. Michigan-The Demise of the Eighth Amendment's Proportionality
Guarantee, 38 Loy. L. Rev. 255, 272 (1992) ("Although only three Justices subscribed
to the reasoning in [Justice Kennedy's] opinion, the four dissenting Justices would
certainly ... call for the application of the grossly disproportionate test in lieu of no
evaluation at all ....").
89 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, argued for a narrow
proportionality principle. The dissenting Justices-White, Blackmun, Stevens, and
Marshall-advocated a rigorous proportionality review. Hence at least seven Justices
supported some level of proportionality guarantee.
90 Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist would have eliminated the intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparisons in all instances, thus creating a fiveJustice majority-Scalia, Relmquist, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter-for the proposition tliat intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparisons need not be
conducted in most cases. Conversely, Justices White, Blackmun, and Marshall advocated using the entire Helm framework in every case, thus creating a seven-Justice
majority-Blackmun, White, Marsliall, Stevens, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souterfor the proposition that wlien tliere is an inference of gross disproportionality tlie
Helm intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparisons must be conducted.
91 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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ity review of excessive criminal punishments survives, successful
challenges are nearly impossible.92
B. Proponionality Review of Excessive Punitive Damages Awards
J

Unlike constitutional challenges to excessive criminal punishments, which can be traced back over 100 years, constitutional
challenges to excessive punitive damages awards are a fairly recent
phenomenon. Even though punitive damages have been around for
a long time,93 it was not until recently that the frequency and size of
punitive damages verdicts increased dramatically.94 The explosion
of punitive damages, not surprisingly, led to constitutional objections. In large part, these constitutional challenges find their
genesis in a 1986 article by Professor John Calvin Jeffries, Jr.95 Professor Jeffries posited that repetitive punitive damages awards
arising out of a single course of conduct could amount to an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment96 or could violate
due process.97 In making the due process argument, Professor Jeffries first argued that multiple puuitive damages verdicts for the
same course of conduct would amount to a double penalty and
hence would violate the guarantee of fundamental fairness inher-

92
See Deborah M. Furhan, Note, Harmelin v. Michigan: Should the Existence of an
Eighth Amendment Guarantee of Proportionate Prison Sentences Rest on the Fate of
Titus Oates and the Dreaded Consequences of Overtime Parking?, 22 Sw. U. L. Rev.
1133,1176 (1993) ("[I]n one fell swoop, the highest Court of this nation destroyed one
hundred years of American common law that had rightly declared that the Supreme
Court, under the Eighth Amendment, should function as a check against abuses of
power by elected officials when setting criminal prison sentences."); Kelly A. Patch,
Note, Harmelin v. Michigan: Is Proportionate Sentencing Merely Legislative Grace?,
1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1697, 1723 ("[The Harmelin] Court has virtually eliminated any
proportionality guarantee ....").
93
Punitive damages awards date back to eighteenth century common law. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1, 12-20 (1982) (discussing the origins of puuitive damages); Note, Exemplary
Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517, 518 (1957).
94
See supra note 4. A recent example is a California jury's award of almost $5 billion in punitive damages to a family burned because of the location of a gas tank in a
GM car. See Sarah Tippit, Jury Awards $4.9 Billion in Car Crash, Pittsburgh PostGazette, July 10,)999, at A1, available in 1999 WL 5282088.
95
See Jeffries, supra note 4.
96
See id. at 147-51.
'17 See id. at 151-58.
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ent in the Due Process Clause.98 Professor Jeffries then turned to
history, particularly the Magna Carta, to assert that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was intended to incorporate a
prohibition against excessive civil penalties.99
Although the-Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that excessive punitive damages could violate the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment100 (as well as the argument that punitive
damages awards could violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendmene01 ) the Court has, in a series of cases, embraced
the idea that excessive punitive damages can violate due process.
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,un the Supreme
Court upheld a punitive damages verdict against a due process
challenge that the verdict was excessive. In doing so, however, the
Court made clear for the first time that excessive punitive damages
verdicts could be violative of due process. 103
See id. at 153.
See id. at 156-58.
100 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 263-64 (1989)
("Whatever the outer confines of the [Excessive Fines] Clause's reach may be, we
now decide only that it does not constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit
when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a
share of the damages awarded."). Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented from the Court's conclusion that punitive damages do not come within the
purview of the Excessive Fines Clause, arguing as a historical matter that the clause
did place limits on punitive damages. See id. at 287-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). More interesting, however, was Justice O'Connor's contention that the Court should adopt the Solem v. Helm framework to determine which
punitive damages awards amounted to excessive fines. See id. at 300-01 (O'Connor,
J., concurring and dissenting in part). The inconsistency of Justice O'Connor's position is explained infra at note 157.
101 See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989) ("[N]othing in today's opinion precludes a private party from filing a civil suit seeking damages for conduct that
previously was the subject of criminal prosecution and punishment. The protections
of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by litigation between private parties.") (citation omitted).
102 499 U.S.1 (1991).
103
See id. at 18. Prior to Haslip, the Court had hinted that excessive punitive damages verdicts could be constitutionally infirm on due process grounds. See BrowningFe"is, 492 U.S. at 276 ("The parties agree that due process imposes some limits on
jury awards of punitive damages ...."); id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Several
of our decisions indicate that even where a statute sets a range of possible civil damages that may be awarded to a private litigant, the Due Process Clause forbids
damages awards that are 'grossly excessive ...."'). Nevertheless, the Court refused to
address squarely the applicability of the Due Process Clause to excessive punitive
damages claims prior to Haslip. See Bankers Life & Ca_s. Co., v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S.
98

99
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In 1981 au agent of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company embezzled insurance premiums, which resulted in the cancellation of
Cleopatra Haslip's insurance and an adverse effect on her credit. 104
An Alabama jury awarded Haslip $1,040,000 in general damages,
likely including $200,000 in compensatory damages and $840,000 in
punitive damages. 105 Pacific Mutual appealed the verdict, contending that unlimited jury discretion in awarding punitive damages
violated due process/06
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun107 first explained that
the common-law method of allowing juries to assess punitive damages did not itself violate due process/08 and further that the
punitive damages award assessed against Pacific Mutual did not
violate due process. 109 While recognizing that unlimited jury discretion might result in extreme verdicts, Justice Blackmun stated that
the Court could not draw a mathematical bright line between constitutionally acceptable and constitutionally unacceptable punitive
damages verdicts. 110 The Court did remark, however, that the punitive damages award-which was four times greater than the
compensatory damages-was "close to the line."111 Therefore,
while the Haslip Court focused primarily on procedural due process, the Court's final comment that a four-to-one punitive-tocompensatory damages ratio came "close to the line" implied the
existence of a substantive guarantee against excessive punitive
damages.
Two years after Haslip, in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 112 a plurality of the Court expressly recognized what
71,76-80 (1988) (declining to decide whether the Due Process Clause placed limits on
punitive damages because the issue had not been raised in state court); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986) (refusing to decide the applicability of
the Due Process Clause because the case could be resolved on narrower grounds).
1M See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 4-5.
1os See id. at 7 n.2.
ul6 See id. at 7.
107
Justice Blackmun's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Relmquist and Justices
White, Marshall, and Stevens. Justices Scalia and Kennedy also voted with the majority but concurred in separate opinions. Justice O'Connor issued a dissenting opinion.
Justice Souter did not participate in Haslip. See id. at 2.
1138
Se.e id. at 17.
109 See id. at 19.
110 See id. at 18.
111 Id. at 23.
112 509 u.s. 443 (1993).
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had been implied in Haslip: The Due Process Clause affords substantive protection against excessive punitive damages awards.
During a property dispute, TXO frivolously alleged a cloud on the
property's title in an attempt to defraud Alliance Resources. 113 Although Alliance Resources suffered only $19,000 in actual
damages, the jury awarded $10 million in punitive damages, a ratio
of 1 to 526.114 Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Blackmun, sought to determine if the punitive damages
. awarded were so "'grossly excessive' as to violate the. substantive
component of the Due Process Clause."115 Although Justice Stevens
recognized that the 526-to-1 punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio was high (and was certainly higher than the four-to-one ratio
that the Haslip Court had called "close to the line"), the Court
concluded that the award was not grossly excessive.116
Shortly after TX0, 111 in BMW of North America v. Gore, 118 a
majority of the Court struck down a punitive damages award as
grossly excessive. Building on Haslip and TXO, a majority of the
Court explicitly recognized a substantive due process protection
against unreasonable punitive damages awards.
Dr. Ira Gore, Jr., purchased an automobile from BMW of North
America ("BMW"). After he discovered that BMW had repainted
the car after the paint was damaged in transit,119 Gore sued BMW

See id. at 447-51 (Opinion of Stevens, J.).
See id. at 451, 453 (Opinion of Stevens, J. ).
ns Id. at 458 (Opinion of Stevens, J.).
116 See id. at 460--62 (Opinion of Stevens, J.). Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun and Stevens to uphold the punitive damages verdict. However, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas adamantly
opposed the creation of a substantive due process protection against unreasonable
punitive damages. See id. at 470-72 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
117 One year after TXO, the Court decided another excessive punitive damages case,
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994). Oberg had been awarded $5 million
in punitive damages by an Oregon jury for an injury resulting from a design defect in
his three-wheel Honda vehicle. See id. at 418. Honda alleged that the $5 million punitive damages verdict-an award five times Oberg's compensatory damages-was
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See id. The Court reiterated that the Constitution places substantive limits on the size of punitive damages
awards. Explaining that post-trial review of punitive damages awards is a key procedural safeguard to protect big business from jury bias, the Court struck down the
award because Oregon lacked such post-trial review. See id. at 432.
118 517 u.s. 559 (1996).
119 See id. at 563.
113

114
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for the depreciation in value of his car. An Alabama jury awarded
him $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive
damages;120 the Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive
damages award to $2 million. 121
On appeal, a majority of the Supreme Coure22 announced, for
the first time, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment affords substantive protection against grossly excessive ·punitive damages awards. 123 Writing for the Court, Justice
Stevens established three guideposts to determine when punitive
damages verdicts are so excessive as to be unconstitutional. First, a
court should look to the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct
that gave rise to the punitive award. 124 For example, trickery and
deceit are more reprehensible than negligence. 125 Second, courts
should compare the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. 126
Justice Stevens noted, however, as the Court had in Haslip, that no
mathematical formula can determine when a ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages is excessive; instead, case-by-case analysis
is necessary. 127 Third and finally, the majority instructed that punitive damages awards should be compared with existing civil or
criminal sanctions for comparable misconduct. 128
All three guideposts suggested that the punitive damages award
in BMW v. Gore was grossly excessive. The Court found that
BMW's actions did not injure anyone and were not reprehensible,129 that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages-a ratio
of 500 to 1-was extremely high130 (and greater than the ratio in
both Haslip and TXOm), and that the $2 million punitive damages
See id. at 565.
See id. at 567.
122 The majority was composed of Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and
BreyeLSeeid.at561.
123
See id. at 568.
124 See id. at 575.
125 See id. at 576.
126 See id. at 580.
127
See id. at 582-83.
128
See id. at 583.
129 See id. at 576.
130 See id. at 582.
131 The Court stated that the ratio in TXO had only been ten to one, even though the
actual punitive damages award was 526 times greater than the compensatory damages. See id. at 581. Justice Stevens explained that the $10 million punitive damages
120
121
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verdict was substantially greater than any statutory fine that could
have been imposed, in Alabama or any other jurisdiction, for
BMW's conduct.132 As a result, the Supreme Court struck down the
$2 million punitive damages verdict as unconstitutional. 133
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
dissented. Justice Ginsburg argued that review of state punitive
damages verdicts was an area traditionally left to the states and
that the federal courts should not intervene. 134 Moreover, Justice
Ginsburg pointed out that numerous state legislatures had enacted
or had proposed legislation to limit large punitive damages
awards. 135 In light of this legislative activity, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the Court should defer to the states rather than involve
the federal courts. 136
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, also dissented,
remarking, "I do not regard the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause as a secret repository of substantive guarantees
against 'unfairness."' 137 While acknowledging that the Fourteenth
Amendment provides an opportunity for defendants to contest the
reasonableness of a punitive damages verdict in state court, Justice
Scalia contended that the Fourteenth Amendment does not qffer a
federal guarantee that the award actually be reasonable. 138 Finally,
verdict in TXO had to be considered in context with the potential harm likely to result from TXO's conduct. Even though only $19,000 in actual harm was suffered, the
potential harm would have been at minimum $1 million. As a result, the BMW Court
determined that the TXO punitive damages award of $10 million was only ten times
greater than the compensatory damages. See id.
m See id. at 584.
tll See id. at 585-86. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, concurred, adding that Alabama's lack of procedural safeguards coupled with the "gross
excessiveness" of the award was sufficient to surmount the otherwise "strong presumption of validity" that is given to punitive damages awards. See id. at 596-97
(Breyer, J., concurring).
134 See id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
135 See id. at 614-19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg added an appendix
to her dissent listing twenty-five state laws (or proposed laws) designed to limit punitive damages. These laws included caps on punitive damages, allocation of portions of
punitive damages awards to state agencies, and bifurcation of the liability and punitive damages portions of trials. See infra Part IV.C.1 for an explanation of how this
flurry of legislative activity militates against the Court reaching out to conduct excessiveness review of punitive damages verdicts.
'
136 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
137 ld. at 598-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138 See id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia criticized the majority for announcing a substantive
due process protection against excessive punitive damages without
offering sufficient guidance to other courts on what constitutes an
acceptable level of punitive damages.139
Regardless of whether the dissenters were correct in arguing that
review of punitive damages awards is a matter better left to legislatures, it is clear that Justice Scalia validly criticized the majority for
offering malleable guideposts that failed to provide lower courts
with sufficient guidance. Even though the three guideposts in
BMW appear to offer an objective test providing lower courts with
guidance, in actuality the guideposts are quite vague. 140 The first
BMW benchmark, which instructs courts to assess the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, forces judges to make almost
entirely subjective determinations. The Court's explanation that intentional torts are more reprehensible than negligent ones affords
lower courts neither help nor constraints in deciding if the conduct
at issue is reprehensible enough to merit a large punitive damages
award. The second and third guideposts-comparing the punitive
damages to the compensatory damages and comparing the punitive
damages to any potential civil or criminal sanction-are also subjective to a large degree. 141 For instance, since there is no bright line
rule, one court is free to determine that a punitive to compensatory
damages ratio of 300 to 1 is not disproportionate while another
court could find that a ratio of 30 to 1 is excessive. As such, not
only are the three guideposts vague, they also provide judges with

See id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Peter J. Sajevic, Case Note, Failing the Smell Test: Punitive Damages Awards
Raise the United States Supreme Court's Suspicious Judicial Eyebrow in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, 20 Hamline L. Rev. 507, 538 (1996) ("[T]he Court's
guideposts [in BMW] symbolize the Court's current role in the punitive damage
arena: murky and vague.").
141
See BMW, 517 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he 'guideposts' mark a
road to nowhere .•.. "); Neil B. Stekloff, Note, Raising Five Eyebrows: Substantive
Due Process Review of Punitive Damages Awards After BMW v. Gore, 29 Conn. L.
Rev. 1797, 1817 (1997) ("While they may not 'mark a road to nowhere,' each guidepost is far too subjective and malleable to be meaningful beyond the facts of BMW v.
Gore."); Paul M. Sykes, Note, Marking a Road to Nowhere? Supreme Court Sets Punitive Damages Guideposts in BMW v. Gore, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1084, 1114 (1997)
("[T]he BMW standard is in many ways subjective and requires an ad hoc determination of constitutionality ....").
139
140
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wide latitude to uphold or strike down punitive damages awards as
they see fie 42
Thus, in the punitive damages area, the Court has not only found
a substantive due process protection against excessive punitive
damages awards, it has also empowered lower courts with wide discretion to strike down punitive damages verdicts.

II.

COMPARING PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW OF EXCESSIVE
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENTS WITH REVIEW OF
EXCESSIVE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS

The Supreme Court's decisions in Harmelin v. Michigan and
BMW v. Gore announce different levels of proportionality review
for criminal punishments and punitive damages awards. On the
one hand, the Court has set the bar for successful proportionality
challenges to criminal punishments at an impossibly high level. On
the other hand, the Court has promulgated a vague but potentially
more rigorous review of punitive damages that affords lower courts
the opportunity to strike down excessive punitive damages verdicts
with ease.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Harmelin-widely recognized as the holding143-bluntly stated, "The Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence."144 Since the Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme
sentences that are "grossly disproportionate," Justice Kennedy
opined that "successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [are] exceedingly rare." 145 Having announced that
there could be few, if any, successful excessiveness challenges to a
criminal punishment, Justice Kennedy promulgated a test whereby
lower courts easily could reject proportionality claims with the
142 See Jim Davis II, Note, BMW v. Gore: Why the States (Not the U.S. Supreme
Court) Should Review Substantive Due Process Challenges to Large Punitive Damage Awards, 46 U. Kan. L. Rev. 395,413 (1998) ("The lower courts' initial and varied
interpretations of BMW indicate the three guideposts may 'provide no real guidance
at all' and may merely arm judges with a subjective framework (endorsed by the Supreme Court of the United States) that they can manipulate to justify practically any
desired judgment.").
143 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
144 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14s Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,272 (1980))
1
(emphasis added).
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simple aud subjective conclusion that the punishment does not
seem too severe for the gravity of the offense. Courts no longer
need to consider whether the defendant is being punished more
harshly than other individuals in that jurisdiction or more harshly
than he would be punished in other states. In short, unless a judge
believes that a punishment is so outrageous as not to be commensurate to the crime, the court should dispose of the proportionality
challenge without any further inquiry/46
· Moreover, given the facts and the disposition of Harmelin itself,
the possibility that a court could reasonably conclude that a punishment is so outrageous as to be grossly disproportionate to the
crime is unlikely. In Harmelin, the Supreme Court upheld Harmelin's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole-the most severe punishment possible in the State of
Michigan-for mere possession of 672 grams of cocaine.147 Any
judge faced with a punishment which she believes might create an
inference of gross disproportionality will likely conclude otherwise
once she determines that the punishment at hand is no more disproportionate than the one upheld in Harmelin. 148 In short, after
Harmelin, the prospects that defendants can make successful proportionality challenges to criminal punishments are bleak.
Conversely, after BMW v. Gore, it seems clear that civil defendants can make successful proportionality challenges to punitive
146 Unfortunately, many judges will not be willing to find that a punishment enacted
by a popularly elected legislature creates an inference of gross disproportionality. At
the state level, many judges are elected and must perpetuate an image that they are
"tough on crime." If the Supreme Court does not require rigorous Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis of criminal punishments, it is difficult to believe that
elected state judges will take it upon themselves to conduct rigorous analysis. Faced
with the need to be "tough on crime," and a proportionality test that allows easy affirmation of criminal punishments, some elected state judges may use the Harmelin
test to affirm punishments without hesitation. For a discussion of the problem of judicial review of punishments-albeit capital punishments-and the interplay of politics,
see Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L.
Rev. 759 (1995).
147 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996.
148 See, e.g., United States v. Mack, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 26846, at *8-9 (6th Cir.
Oct. 15, 1998} ("Furthermore, if the life sentence for the possession of 672 grams of
cocaine in Harmelin v. Michigan was constitutional, the same punishment for a crime
involving fifty kilograms of cocaine also must be constitutional."} (internal citations
omitted); see also infra note 160 for additional examples.
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damages verdicts. Unlike in the criminal punishment context,
where the Court announced that successful proportionality challenges would be exceedingly rare, the BMW Court found an
unqualified substantive due process protection against excessive
punitive damages awards.149 'fP.e Court made no effort to limit this
new right: Instead, the Court simply concluded that the Due Process Clause protects defendants against excessive punitive damages
verdicts. Thus, the scope of the right to reasonable punitive damages awards created in BMW is more expansive than the limited
protection against grossly disproportionate criminal punishments
that the Court grudgingly recognized in Harmelin.
Clear evidence of this can be found in the $2 million punitive
damages verdict struck down in BMW itself. While $2 million is
certainly a sizable sum of money, it pales in comparison to the
multi-million or even billion-dollar punitive damages awards
handed down in recent years. 150 Thus, comparatively speaking, the
BMW Court struck down a "mild" excessive punitive damages
award. To make a more applicable-though admittedly roughcomparison, the $2 million punitive damages award struck down in
BMW might be akin to a Court striking down a prison sentence of
five or ten years for possession of narcotics.151 Given that the Supreme Court has been unwilling to find criminal sentences of five
or ten years (or even life sentences) to be disproportionate, the
Court's decision to strike down a comparatively "mild" excessive
punitive damages award signals more rigorous proportionality review of punitive damages awards.
The three BMW guideposts reinforce this conclusion. Unlike the
Harmelin test for criminal punishments, the BMW framework requires courts to assess the reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, as well as the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
and the degree of criminal or civil sanctions that could be imposed
for the defendant's misconduct. The latter two BMW guideposts
require courts to measure objective factors before disposing of a
proportionality challenge; Harmelin does not require courts to consider similar objective factors in proportionality challenges to

See supra notes 118-42 and accompanying text.
supra note 4.
151 I thank Professor William Stuntz for making this point to me.

149

tso See
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criminal punishments (and in fact the Court specifically rejected
such objective benchmarks by replacing the Helm framework with
the Harmelin test).
Taken alone, the presence of objective guideposts to measure
the proportionality of punitive damages awards seems to indicate
that punitive damages verdicts are subject to rigorous review. Interestingly, however, it is the vagueness of the objective guideposts
in BMW that provides for truly rigorous proportionality review of
punitive damages by giving lower courts great flexibility. For instance, the second guidepost under BMW is an analysis of the ratio
of punitive to compensatory damages. Since the Supreme Court refused to draw a mathematical bright line defining what ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages is unacceptable,152 lower courts
have discretion to determine what ratios are unconstitutionally excessive. Thus, one court could strike down a punitive damages
verdict thirty times higher than the compensatory damages even
though another court might conclude that a 300-to-1 ratio was
permissible. Absent a mathematical bright line, the BMW Court
gave lower courts tremendous flexibility to assess the proportionality of punitive damages awards and to utilize this flexibility to
strike down punitive damages verdicts.
The creation of an unqualified substantive due process right to
reasonable punitive damages verdicts and malleable guideposts
that afford lower courts flexibility to strike down punitive damages
verdicts demonstrates that the Supreme Court has afforded rigorous proportionality review to punitive damages awards.
Conversely, in the criminal punishment area, the Court has explicitly stated that successful challenges to the proportionality of
punishments will be exceedingly rare, and the Court has instructed
lower courts to dispose of such challenges without even consulting
any objective criteria. It thus seems clear that the Supreme Court
has afforded much more rigorous proportionality review to excessive
punitive damages awards than to excessive criminal punishments.
In spite of its differing treatment of criminal punishments and
punitive damages awards, the Supreme Court has not offered a

152 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 582-83 ("We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a
mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case.") (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
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consistent explanation of why punitive damages verdicts should receive more rigorous proportionality review than criminal
punishments. The Court's explanation for declining to conduct rigorous proportionality review of potentially excessive criminal
sentences is based, in part, on federalism concerns. Justice Kennedy remarked in Harmelin that "the fixing of prison terms for
specific crimes involves a substantive penological judgment that, as
a general matter, is 'properly within the province of legislatures,
not courts.'" 153 As such, it is "not to be interfered with lightly." 154 In
the punitive damages area, the Court has completely ignored similar federalism concerns. The BMW decision created a federal
substantive due process right to reasonable punitive damages verdicts and in doing so it subordinated the judgments of state courts
and state juries.155 Additionally, by imposing a federal right to reasonable punitive damages verdicts, the Court has invaded the
province of the state legislatures that might have passed (or declined
to pass) laws limiting punitive damages awards. 156 By ignoring the interests of state juries, courts, and legislatures, the BMW Court
showed little regard for the federalism concerns that the Court had
relied upon only a few years earlier in Harmelin, when declining to
review rigorously the proportionality of criminal punishments.
Thus, not only does the Supreme Court afford more rigorous
proportionality review to punitive damages verdicts than to excessive criminal punishments, it has also failed to explain why one
area of law is entitled to more rigorous review than the other. 157
153 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (citing Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1980)).
154 Id. at 1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.

349, 379 (1910)).
155 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156 See id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
157 Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence demonstrates an even clearer example of inconsistency in proportionality review. In both Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957
(1991), and Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), Justice O'Connor voted against objective intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparisons of potentially excessive
criminal punishments. But Justice O'Connor twice voted to conduct intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparisons of potentially excessive punitive damages
awards. See TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 482
(1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S.
257, 300-01 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor thus seemed willing
to conduct vigorous comparative review of punitive damages awards, yet she was unwilling to undertake the same type of objective review of criminal punishments. Like
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III. THE PROOF Is IN THE PROGENY: LOWER COURT
PROPORTIONALITY DECISIONS AFTER
HARMELIN AND BMW

An analysis of lower court decisions following Harmelin and
BMW reinforces the conclusion that punitive damages verdicts are
afforded greater proportionality review than potentially excessive
criminal punishments. Lower courts have rejected hundreds of
proportionality challenges to criminal punishments; only two courts
have relied on Harmelin to find punishments to be disproportionate. 158
Moreover, the two courts that struck down punishments as disproportionate arguably did so only after misapplying Harmelin. Conversely,
after BMW v. Gore, proportionality review of potentially excessive
punitive damages awards is alive and well. Lower courts have seriously analyzed many punitive damages verdicts and in a number of
cases have found the awards to be unconstitutionally excessive.
A. Excessive Criminal Punishment Cases
In the nine years since Harmelin, lower courts have interpreted
that decision narrowly and have primarily rejected proportionality
challenges to excessive punishments on two rationales. First, and
most simply, a number of courts have upheld appellants' punishments on the grounds that their offenses were more serious than
Harmelin's or that their punishments were less severe. 159 Second,
the Court as a whole, Justice O'Connor offered no explanation for this differing
treatment of punitive damages and criminal punishments.
158 See State v. Bartlett, 830 P.2d 823, 832 (Ariz. 1992); State v. Bonner, 577 N.W.2d
575, 581 (S.D. 1998).
159 See Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without
Parole on Juveniles, 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 681, 703 n.109 (1998) ("Not surprisingly,
the Supreme Court's decisions approving sentences of life (Rummel) and LWOP
(Harmelin) for nonviolent recidivist acts and drug possession, respectively, have been
used as 'benchmarks' to readily deny proportionality challenges to heavy sentences
for violent crime."). For a few (of many) examples, see United States v. Mack, 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 26846, at *8-9 (6th Cir. Oct. 15, 1998) ("Furthermore, if the life
sentence for the possession of 672 grams of cocaine in Harmelin v. Michigan was constitutional, the same punishment for a crime involving fifty kilograms of cocaine also
must be constitutional.") (citations omitted); United States v. Van Winrow, 951 F.2d
1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Winrow was convicted of an offense as serious as the offense in Harmelin. We are therefore bound by Harme/in to hold a mandatory
sentence of life without parole was not unconstitutionally disproportionate to Winrow's offense."); United States v. Dunson, 940 F.2d 989, 995 (6th Cir. 1991) ("If the
life sentence intposed in Harmelin was constitutional, it follows a fortiori that Mr.
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and more commonly, a majority of courts have disposed of disproportionality challenges by following Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion in Harmelin and concluding that defendants' punishments
did not create inferences of gross disproportionality. This latter
category can be divided into two subcategories: cases in which
courts undertook substantial analysis to conclude that the punishment did not appear grossly disproportionate, 160 and cases in which
courts curtly concluded, without any substantive analysis, that the
defendants' challenges were not disproportionate under Harmelin.161
In the aftermath of Harmelin, lower courts have upheld many
arguably disproportionate punishments. For instance, a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel relied on Harmelin to affirm a ten-year
sentence for intent to sell three ounces of marijuana. 162 Similarly,
the District Court for the District of Columbia upheld a thirty-year
sentence for a recidivist convicted of possession of eight grams of
narcotics. 163 A Texas appeals court relied on Harmelin to uphold a
five-year sentence for a nonviolent offender convicted of seconddegree burglary of habitation.164 Harmelin also provided the impetus for a Missouri appeals court to uphold an eighty-year sentence
Dunson's 20-year sentence [for possession and intent to distribute seven kilograms of
cocaine] is constitutional."); State v. Silverman, 977 P.2d 1186 (Or. App. 1999) (upholding a 75-month sentence for first-degree sexual abuse of a child after comparing
the offense to Harmelin).
160 See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) (reviewing the
government's interest in punishing repeat offenders and the defendant's 13 prior violent felonies to conclude that a sentence of life without parole for the crime of being a
felon in possession of a firearm does not create an inference of gross disproportionality); United States v. Hickey, 822 F. Supp. 408, 411 (B.D. Mich. 1993) (analyzing the
Congressional purpose behind long prison sentences for repeat drug offenders and
concluding that there is no extreme disparity between a sentence of life imprisonment
and the crime of distributing drugs near a school).
161 See, e.g., Porter v. Bums, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8385, at *3 (9th Cir. Apr. 27,
1998) (rejecting defendant's disproportionality challenge to a 10-year sentence for intent to sell less than three grams of marijuana simply because it "fails under Harmelin
v. Michigan"); United States v. Morse, 983 F.2d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 1993) (concluding
without analysis that a 36-month sentence for possession of unauthorized credit cards
with intent to defraud is not grossly disproportionate); State v. Robertson, 939 P.2d
863, 865 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997) (upholding a life sentence for second-degree murder
after stating only that "[u]pon review of the entire record presented, we conclude that
the sentence imposed under the facts of this case is not grossly disproportionate").
162 See Porter, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8385 at *4.
163 See United States v. Spencer, 817 F. Supp. 176 (D.D.C. 1993).
161 See Sullivan v. State, 975 S.W.2d 755, 757-58 (Tex. Ct. App.1998).
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for a recidivist convicted of two daytime burglaries. 165 Despite a
plethora of cases meting
out lengthy punishments for arguably mi1
nor crimes, only two courts have struck down punishments as
disproportionate in the nine years since Harmelin. Perhaps more
telling than the small number is the fact that both of those cases
misinterpreted Harmelin. Under a proper Harmelin analysis those
two "excessive" punishments might well have been upheld.
In State v. Bartlett,166 the Arizona Supreme Court relied on Harmelin to strike down a forty-year sentence for two statutory rape
convictions. Rather than asking whether a forty-year sentence created an inference of gross disproportionality, and only then
proceeding to intrajurisdictional and mterjurisdictional comparisons, the Arizona Supreme Court immediately undertook a
searching review of the merits of Bartlett's punishment. The court
observed that Bartlett's offenses were nonviolent and that the
trend in the law was to construe statutory rape as a less serious
crime.167 Under a proper reading of Harrnelin, however, the court
should not have considered these factors. Since statutory rape is a
serious offense, one could easily conclude that a forty-year sentence for two convictions does not create an inference of gross
disproportionality. 168 Without such an inference, Harmelin instructs
lower courts to end the inquiry and to uphold the sentence. As
such, a proper reading of Harmelin required the court to uphold
Bartlett's sentence.
The same flaw occurred in the South Dakota Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Bonner. 169 In Bonner, the court found a fifteenyear sentence for second-degree burglary to be unconstitutionally
excessive.170 The court established an inference of gross disproportionality by finding that Bonner's two codefendants received
substantially less punishment and that South Dakota punished

See State v. Williams, 936 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
830 P.2d 823 (Ariz. 1992).
167 See id. at 828-29.
168 See id. at 835 (Corocan, J., dissenting) ("I believe that the sentences imposed in
this case are not grossly disproportionate to the offenses committed in light of the
threat posed to the individual and to society by engaging in sexual misconduct with
children.").
169 577 N.W.2d 575 (S.D. 1998).
170 See id. at 581.
165

166
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more serious offenses with shorter prison terms. 171 Such findings,
however, result from intrajurisdictional comparisons that the court
should not undertake unless it already has found an inference of
gross disproportionality. Thus, the information about Bonner's codefendants and the comparison of other punishments in South
Dakota should not have been considered unless the court was convinced, in the abstract, that a fifteen-year sentence for seconddegree burglary appeared grossly disproportionate. Hence, as another commentator has observed, the result in Bonner was
probably erroneous. 172
The Harmelin progeny demonstrate that the Supreme Court has
not afforded rigorous proportionality review of criminal punishments. First, and most importantly, courts have rejected hundreds
of proportionality challenges-including some legitimate challenges-to criminal punishments under the Harmelin framework.
Second, the only two post-Harmelin findings of disproportionate
punishment were the result of misapplication173 of the Harmelin
framework and probably should have been upheld. As such, the
evidence demonstrates that virtually no appellate protection
against disproportionate criminal punishments exists.
B. Excessive Punitive Damages Cases

While Harmelin has rendered proportionality review of criminal
punishments dead in the lowe~ courts, BMW v. Gore has afforded
those same courts wide latitude to determine _that excessive puniSee id. at 581--82.
msee Joel E. Hunter, Note, State v. Bonner: In Search of an Objective Eighth
Amendment Analysis for "Cruel and Unusual Punishment" in South Dakota, 44 S.D.
L. Rev. 399, 428 (1999) ("If, however, the [Bonner] court had strictly constrained its
analysis to the test supplied by Justice Kennedy in Harmelin, a different result would
have invariably been reached.").
173
Bartlett and Bonner are not the only cases to apply the Harmelin framework incorrectly; other courts have continued to conduct intrajurisdictional and
interjurisdictional comparisons without first finding an inference of gross disproportionality. See United States v. Kratsas, 45 F.3d 63 (4th Cir. 1995) (undertaking the full
Helm test); United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); United
States v. Angulo-Lopez, 7 F.3d 1506 (lOth Cir. 1993) (undertaking a very limited
Helm analysis); United States v. Lowden, 955 F.2d 128 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying an
interjurisdictional comparison); State v. Price, 721 So. 2d 511 (La. Ct. App. 1998)
(conducting an intrajurisdictional comparison). While all of these courts misapplied
Harmelin, none struck down a punishment as disproportionate.
m
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tive damages verdicts violate due process. Appellate courts have
not hesitated to utilize this discretion. 174 While a number of courts
have applied BMW and subsequently rejected what could be seen
as plausible challenges to the constitutionality of punitive damages
verdicts/75 at minimum, ten courts have relied on BMW to explicitly find punitive damages verdicts to be so excessive as to violate
due process176 and hence to be unconstitutiona1. 177
174 But see Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of Punitive
Damages Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact of BMW v. Gore on Punitive
Damages Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Damages Awards Will Be Reduced, 7 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 59,79--83 (1999) (finding no significant difference either
in the pattern of awards before or after BMW or in the rate at which courts ordered
reduction of punitive damages after BMW).
175 See, e.g., United States v. Big D Enterprises, 184 F.3d 924, 928 (8t1I Cir. 1999)
(upholding a $100,000 punitive damages verdict for a Fair Housing Act violation resulting in $1,000 in compensatory damages); Johansen v. Combustion Engineering,
170 F.3d 1320, 1327, 1340 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding tliat a $4.35 million punitive damages verdict for a nuisance and trespass water pollution claim was not excessive even
though compensatory damages were only $47,000); Daka, Inc. v. Breiner, 711 A.2d
86, 88 (D.C. 1998) (upholding a $390,000 punitive damages verdict that was 39 times
higher than compensatory damages); Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d
456, 458, 468 (Idaho 1996) (holding tliat a $3.2 million punitive damages verdict that
was 26 times higher tlian the compensatory damages did not violate due process);
Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman, 705 N.E.2d 539, 544, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to find a $13.8 million punitive damages verdict for a defectively made vehicle
resulting in injuries to be unconstitutional); Axen v. American Home Prods. Corp. ex.
rei. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 974 P.2d 224,228,244 (Or. Ct. App.1999) (finding that a $20
million punitive damages verdict for a medication resulting in blindness was not unconstitutionally excessive); Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 958 P.2d 854, 857 (Or. Ct.
App. 1998) (refusing to find a $2 million punitive damages verdict for a false arrest
claim resulting in $125,000 in compensatory damages to be excessive); Schaffer v.
Edward D. Jones & Co., 552 N.W.2d 801,804,817 (S.D. 1996) (finding that a $750,000
punitive damages verdict for a fraud claim of $25,000 in actual damages was not a violation of substantive due process).
176 See Watkins v. Lundell, 169 F.3d 540, 547 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding a $3.5 million
punitive damages verdict for fraudulent business practices to be unconstitutional);
FDIC v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 854, 862 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that a $1.2 million punitive damages verdict for fraud is unconstitutional); Continental Trend Resources v.
OXY USA, 101 F.3d 634, 642 (10th Cir. 1996) (striking down a $30 lnillion punitive
damages verdict for tortious interference with contract as unconstitutional); Life Ins.
Co. v. Parker, 726 So. 2d 619, 625 (Ala. 1998) (finding that a $200,000 punitive damages award for insurance fraud and misrepresentation violates due process); Ford
Motor Co. v. Sperau, 708 So. 2d 111, 125 (Ala. 1997) (finding tliat a $6 million punitive damages verdict for fraud and misrepresentation violates due process); American
Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 704 So. 2d 1361, 1367 (Ala. 1997) (holding that a
$2 million punitive damages verdict for insurance fraud and breach of contract violates due process); Cates Constr. v. Talbot Partners, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 571 (Cal. Ct.
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v.

The Tenth Circuit's decision in Continental Trend Resources
OXY USA/18 finding a $30 million punitive damages verdict to be
so excessive as to violate due process, provides an excellent example of the willingness of post-BMW courts to strike down punitive
damages awards as unconstitutional, as well as the flexibility those
courts have to do so. OXY had intentionally and repeatedly interfered with the plaintiff's business contracts and falsified documents
morder to harm the179plaintiffs; this resulted in a $30 million punitive damages award. The OXY court applied BMW's first prong
and assessed the reprehensibility of this conduce80 While the court
found this conduct to be reprehensible, it concluded that the highest possible punitive damages award was not permissible because
OXY's actions resulted only in economic harm.181 Turning to
App.) (striking down a $28 million punitive damages verdict for breach of good faith
and fair business dealing as unconstitutional); Langmead v. Admiral Cruises, 696 So.
2d 1189, 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that a $3.5 million punitive damages
verdict for failure to pay plaintiff's salary while she was injured violates substantive
due process); Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, 965 P.2d 440, 452 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a $1 million punitive damages verdict for fraudulently selling a vehicle
without disclosing extensive defects is unconstitutional); Apache Corp. v. Moore, 960
S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (striking down as unconstitutional a punitive
damages verdict of $562,500 for negligently causing a gas well to explode). Virtually
all of the cases finding punitive damages verdicts to be unconstitutional on excessiveness grounds involved economic harm; high punitive damages awards for fraud and
misrepresentation have frequently been struck down.
177 The conclusion that ten cases have found punith:e damages verdicts to be unconstitutional is a conservative estimate. Some courts have employed BMW to find
punitive damages verdicts to be excessive without actually stating that they were finding the size of the verdict to be unconstitutional. See Inter Med. Supplies v. EBI Med.
Sys., 181 F.3d 446, 465-67 (3d Cir. 1999) (relying on BMW to find a $100.6 million punitive damages verdict for torts flowing from breach of contract to be excessive, but
never stating that the verdict was unconstitutional or violated due process); Denesha
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 161 F.3d 491, 502-05 (8th Cir. 1998) (mentioning that due process is one consideration in punitive damages cases, but not explaining whether a due
process violation was the reason a $4 million punitive damages verdict was found to
be excessive); Wilson v. IBP, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 132, 145-48 (Iowa 1996) (explaining
that punitive damages verdicts must comport with the due process standards set down
in Haslip, TXO, and BMW, but only finding that a $15 million punitive damages
award was "excessive"). Though some of these cases may be construed as finding punitive damages verdicts to be unconstitutional, this Note has omitted them from the
analysis since the courts themselves never explicitly found the verdicts to be unconstitutional.
178101 F.3d 634 (lOth Cir. 1996).
179 See id. at 638-39.
180 See id.
181 Seeid.
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BMWs second factor, the Tenth Circuit panel compared the ratio
of punitive to compensatory damages. The court concluded that
because this was only an economic-injury case, the ratio of punitive
to compensatory damages should not exceed ten to one, a ratio
substantially smaller than the thirty-to-one verdict awarded by the
jury. 182 Applying BMWs third factor, comparable civil and criminal
penalties for the defendant's misconduct, the court determined that
OXY's misconduct amounted to a common-law tort that could not
easily be compared to civil or criminal penalties.183 Finally, although
BMW did not instruct it do so, the Tenth Circuit panel considered
OXY's wealth in deciding whether the $30 million punitive damages verdict was excessive. 184 The court concluded that $30 million
was far more than necessary to punish and affect the conduct of a
defendant of OXY's size. 185 Based on all of these factors, the court
concluded that the maximum constitutionally permissible punitive
damages verdict was $6 million. 186 The court ordered remittitur to
that amount, instructing the plaintiffs to accept $6 million or to undertake a new trial. 187
OXY speaks volumes about the discretion post-BMW courts
have to strike down (or uphold, for that matter) punitive damages
awards. On the one hand, the Tenth Circuit panel could have determined that, while offensive, tortious interference with contract
was not reprehensible enough to merit a sizable punitive damages
award; 188 on the other hand, the court just as easily could have upheld the $30 million verdict because OXY's intentional and
repeated conduct was sufficiently reprehensible. 189 The court had
equal discretion in assessing the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages. Purportedly reasoning from the Supreme Court's deciSee id. at 639-40.
See id. at 641.
1&4 See id. at 642.
185 See id.
186 See id. at 643.
187
See id.
188
Cf. Dyer v. Bergman & Assocs., 657 A.2d 1132, 1139 n.10 (D.C. 1995) (suggesting
that punitive damages might not be available for tortious interference with contract).
189
The dissent, for instance, argued that OXY's conduct was sufficiently egregious
to support a $20 million punitive damages verdict. See OXY, 101 F.3d at 644-45
(Brown, J., dissenting); see also Central Telecommunications v. TCI Cablevision, 800
F.2d 711, 730--31 {8th Cir. 1986) (upholding a $25 million punitive damages verdict for
tortious interference with contract).
182

183
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sions in Haslip and TX0, 190 the OXY court concluded that the
maximum permissible punitive to compensatory damages ratio in
economic-injury cases was ten to orie.191 While ten to one sounds
like a fair ratio, the court could just as easily have concluded that
the constitutional ceiling for a punitive to compensatory damages
ratio in economic-injury cases was four to one,192 or forty to one.193
The OXY decision also demonstrates that lower courts have flexibility to stray from the three BMW factors in assessing the
proportionality of punitive damages. The Tenth Circuit panel essentially ignored the third BMW prong194-comparable civil and
criminal penalties-and at the same time considered the defendant's wealth,195 a factor not even present in the Supreme Court's
BMW test.
The OXY decision demonstrates that the supposedly "objective"
BMW guideposts provide almost no objective constraints. The Supreme Court's failure to announce a maximum ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages permits lower courts to make up any ratio
190

See supra notes 102-16 and accompanying text.
See OXY, 101 F3d at 639.
192 See Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, 708 So. 2d 111, 120 (Ala. 1997) (finding a $6 million punitive damages award unconstitutionally excessive even though it was only 3.5
times greater than the compensatory damages).
193 See Daka, Inc. v. Breiner, 711 A.2d 86, 88 (D.C. 1998) (finding that a $390,000
punitive damages verdict that was 39 times higher than the compensatory damages
was not so grossly excessive as to violate due process); Walston v. Monumental Life
Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 458, 468 (Idaho 1996) (finding that a $10 million punitive damages verdict for bad faith denial of insurance benefits did not offend the Constitution
even though it was 26 times greater than the actual damages); Williams v. Aetna Fin.
Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 870-71 (Ohio 1998) (finding that a $1.5 million punitive damages
verdict for conspiracy and fraud did not violate due process even though it was .100
times greater than the economic damages); Schaffer v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 552
N.W.2d 801, 804 (S.D. 1996) (finding that a $750,000 punitive damages verdict for
fraud did not offend due process even though it was 30 times greater than the compensatory damages).
194 The OXY court at least mentioned the third BMW prong before declining to utilize it. Other courts have neglected to even mention the third prong in their analysis.
See, e.g., Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001, 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding a
$70,000 punitive damages verdict against a constitutional challenge without discussing
comparable civil or criminal penalties).
195 For additional examples of lower courts using the wealth factor to strike down
punitive damages verdicts, see Watkins v. Lundell, 169 F.3d 540 (8th Cir.1999); FDIC
v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 854 (lOth Cir. 1997); Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, 708 So. 2d 111
(Ala. ~997); American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Willimnson, 704 So. 2d 1361 (Ala.
1997).
191

HeinOnline -- 86 Va. L. Rev. 1283 2000

1284

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 86:1249

they see fit. Additionally, the flexibility of the BMW test permits
lower courts to ignore some guideposts-such as comparable civil
and criminal sanctions-and create other guideposts, such as the
defendant's wealth. 196 BMW thus provided courts with overly broad
discretion to strike down (or uphold) punitive damages awards as
unconstitutionally excessive.
Despite this flexibility, there is also evidence that BMW has lowered the constitutional ceiling, thus forcing lower courts to assess
more rigorously the constitutionality of punitive damages verdicts.
In OXY, the Tenth Circuit had originally upheld the $30 million
punitive damages verdice97 However, after deciding BMW, the
United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment in OXY so
that it could be reconsidered in light of the BMW holding. 198 Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit relied on BMW to reduce the previously
acceptable $30 million punitive damages verdict to $6 million. 199 In
a similar tum of events, three other punitive damages verdicts were
struck down as nnconstitutional after the BMW decision, even
though the verdicts had originally been upheld. 200 Thus, there is
some evidence that BMW not only provides lower courts with the
opportunity to strike down punitive damages awards, but also that
it encourages them to do so.
Three conclusions can be drawn from the BMW progeny. First,
BMW sends a signal to lower courts that they should rigorously assess the proportionality of punitive damages verdicts. Second, the
BMW framework affords lower courts tremendous discretion to
carry out this task. Finally, lower courts have used their discretion

196 One court has interpreted BMW so flexibly as to allow for comparisons of punitive damages verdicts handed down in other cases. See Parrot v. Carr Chevrolet, 965
P.2d 440, 453 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
197 See Continental Trend Resources v. OXY USA, 44 F.3d 1465, 1480 (lOth Cir.
1995), vacated sub nom. OXY USA v. Continental Trend Resources, 517 U.S. 1216
(1996).
198
See OXY USA v. Continental Trend Resources, 517 U.S. 1216, 1216-17 (1996).
199
See Continental Trend Resources v. OXY USA, 101 F.3d 634, 643 (lOth Cir.
1996).
200 See Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, 708 So. 2d 111 (Ala. 1997); American Pioneer Life
Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 704 So. 2d 1361 (Ala. 1997); Apache Corp. v. Moore, 960
S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
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to strike down a number of punitive damages awards that otherwise would have been upheld.201
The Harmelin and BMW progeny confirm that more rigorous
proportionality review is afforded to punitive damages verdicts
than to criminal punishments. Except for two cases that misinterpreted Harmelin, lower courts have rejected all proportionality
challenges to criminal punishments, often after only cursory analysis. Those same courts have rigorously assessed the proportionality
of punitive damages awards and have not hesitated to find verdicts
unconstitutionally excessive.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXCESSIVE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENTS AND
EXCESSIVE PUNITIVE DAMAGES VERDICTS: WHICH AREA
SHOULD BE AFFORDED GREATER PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW?

It is clear that the Supreme Court has endorsed more rigorous
proportionality review of punitive damages verdicts than of criminal punishments. Putting aside arguments that courts should not
conduct proportionality review in either context,202 the key question
is whether punitive damages verdicts should be entitled to more
rigorous proportionality review. Put another way, the question is
whether punitive damages verdicts and excessive punishments
should be given the same degree of judicial review, or whether one
area is entitled to more stringent review than the other.

201 BMW has been so far-reaching that it has had impact outside the constitutional
domain; courts have relied on the BMW framework to strike down excessive punitive
damages on nonconstitutional grounds. Set'?, e.g., Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare
Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 943 (5th Cir. 1996) ("We understand that BMW deals with constitutional limits on punitive damages, but we find it instructive [in a statutory challenge
to excessive punitive damages].") (emphasis added).
202 See, e.g., Mackey, supra note 21, at 635-45 (reviewing arguments against federal
courts' involvement in proportionality review of criminal punishments). Opponents of
appellate proportionality review maintain that legislatures are better equipped than
courts to make such decisions, and that principles of federalism entitle legislatures to
promulgate their own laws even in the face of less punitive laws of other states. See
Kevin L. Hicks, Note, Worse Than TXO: Substantive Due Reasonableness in BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 20 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 310, 320 (1996) ("Imposition of constitutional 'reasonableness' standards through substantive review of
punitive awards is quite simply an infringement of the States' power to make and enforce their own laws.").

HeinOnline -- 86 Va. L. Rev. 1285 2000

1286

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 86:1249

A. The (Incorrect) Argument That Punitive Damages Awards
Should Be Afforded More Rigorous Proportionality Review

At first glance, it makes sense for the Court to afford more
strenuous judicial review to punitive damages verdicts. Punitive
damages awards are handed down by juries, usually composed of
twelve randomly selected persons who typically have no expertise
in the law or the subject matter of the case. As such, these jurors
may not have the ability to mete out a proper penalty, and excessive
verdicts may result. 203 Conversely, criminal sentences are prescribed
by statutes that were drafted by sovereign and (hopefully) competent legislatures. Unlike punitive damages verdicts, which are
assigned by juries without reference to the size of other punitive
damages awards, legislatures carefully determine criminal penalties
in the context of other offenses so as to create a graduated system
of punishments.204 The argument, therefore, is that the Supreme
Court should be more inclined to allow carefully determined legislative criminal punishments to stand while affording greater
judicial review to randomly assessed punitive damages verdicts.
This logic, however, is flawed.
Quite simply, juries do not have the final say on the size of punitive damages awards. Nearly all jury verdicts are subject to review
by the trial judge.205 If the judge believes the verdict is excessive,
she may order remittitur. Remittitur is a reduction of the jury's ex203 See Paul Magin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 179, 207-15 (1998) (arguing that juries are not in a good position to set
punitive damages because they are susceptible to emotional factors, are unduly influenced by a defendant's wealth, and are often unfamiliar with the sanctions imposed
for similar misconduct); see also Ellis, supra note 93, at 37-39 (lamenting jury discretion in punitive damages cases because juries ltave no independent knowledge of the
legal standards, and the instructions jurors are given are vague and unilluminating);
Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 Ala. L. Rev.
975, 1003-{)7 (1989) (recommending that judges determine punitive damages).
204 In addition to the well-known federal sentencing guidelines, a number of states
have also enacted rigid sentencing guidelines that carefully determine the punishment
for a given offense. See Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 25-31 (1996). Moreover,
while many states still entrust judges and juries with wide discretion to make sentencing decisions, even these states constrain sentencing discretion by providing a range of
minimum and maximum punishments.
205 See Irene Deaville Sann, Remittiturs (And Additurs) in the Federal Courts: An
Evaluation with Suggested Alternatives, 38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 157, 165-67 (1987)
(explainiug that remittitur has been utilized in every federal circuit and most state
courts).
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cessive verdict to an amount of damages that reasonably could
have been assessed against the defendant; the plaintiff then has the
option of accepting this reduced award or undergoing a new trial.206
Trial judges frequently order remittitur of large punitive damages
verdicts207 without a finding that the verdict is unconstitutionally
excessive.208 Moreover, if a trial court decides not to order remittitur, the defendant may appeal the verdict,209 contending that the
trial court abused its discretion by failing to reduce the award.210
The appellate court then has authority to order remittitur of the
punitive damages verdict.211
Given that judges can, and frequently do, order remittitur of punitive damages verdicts and that defendants can appeal trial courts'
See id. at 160-63.
See, e.g., Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, 984 F. Supp. 923 (M.D.N.C.1997) (ordering remittitur of a $5.5 million punitive damages verdict to $315,000); Geuss v.
Pfizer, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Pa.1996) (remitting a $150,000 punitive damages
verdict to $17,500); Iannone v. Frederic R. Harris, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (ordering remittitur of a $250,000 punitive damages award to $50,000).
203
Remittitur is a tricky subject, as it appears to conflict with the Seventh Amendment. The Seventh Amendment, which is only binding against the federal
government, see Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1876), provides in relevant
part that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. Const. amend.
VII. Despite this language, the Supreme Court has held that trial judges may reduce a
jury's award of excessive damages to a permissible level. The logic is that if a trial
judge could order a new trial because the damages were excessive, then the judge
surely has the power to reduce the damages to a permissible level while still awarding
the plaintiff the option of a new trial. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87
(1934). For a history and analysis of remittitur, see Lopez, supra note 5, at 1326-42.
'1m The Supreme Court recently held that this practice, referred to as appellate remittitur, does not violate the Seventh Amendment. See Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 436 (1996).
210 Under the Erie doctrine, see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the
"abuse of discretion" standard applies only to claims based on federal law. When a
claim is based on state law-even if the case is brought pursuant to diversity jurisdiction in federal court-the court must look to state law to determine whether
remittitur is recognized, and, if so, what standard applies. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at
436-39.
211 See, e.g., Hillcrest Center v. Rone, 711 So. 2d 901 (Ala.1997) (ordering remittitur
of a $130,000 punitive damages verdict to $94,000); Union Sec. Life Ins. Co. v.
Crocker, 709 So. 2d 1118 (Ala. 1997) (ordering remittitur of a $2 million punitive
damages verdict to $1 million); Notrica v. State Compensation Ins. Fnnd, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)·(ordering remittitur of a $20 million punitive damages verdict to $5 million). Frequently, however, the appellate court will remand the
case to a lower court to determine the proper remittitur. See, e.g., Smith v. Lightning
Bolt Productions, 861 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1988).
21!6
2111
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decisions not to grant remittitur, it is not accurate to assert that juries impose punitive damages with free rein. Since hefty punitive
damages verdicts are not the work of rogue or incompetent juries,
but rather are judgments approved by trial and appellate courts as
reasonable, there seems littie·reason for punitive damages verdicts
to be entitled to less constitutional deference than criminal punishments. To the contrary, two arguments suggest that courts
should conduct more rigorous proportionality review of criminal
punishments than of punitive damages verdicts.
B. A Brief Argument That Deprivations of Liberty Are More
Serious and in Greater Need of Judicial Review Than
Deprivations of Property

The Declaration of Independence articulated the rights to "life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." 212 The Constitution-in the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendmentsreiterated the importance of these concepts, this time by speaking
of life, liberty, and property. 213 While life, liberty, and property are
all important values, it is important to consider whether one value
is more important than another. If liberty is more important than
property, then excessive criminal punishment cases (which amount
to deprivations of liberty) should be entitled to more rigorous proportionality review than excessive punitive damages verdicts
(which are deprivations of property). While a textual argument can
be made that life, liberty, and property are hierarchical rights of
descending importance, ultimately it is the Supreme Court's capital
punishment and criminal procedure jurisprudence which suggests
that deprivations of liberty are more important than deprivations
of property.
The textual argument that liberty is more important than property is fairly simple (and perhaps, as a result, not very convincing).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states,
"Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."214 Notably, "life" is listed first, "liberty" second, and "property" third. If the Framers had intended
The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
See U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
14
2 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

212
213
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property to be more important than liberty, they would have listed
property before liberty in the text of the amendment. The text
therefore seems to indicate, at minimum, that property was not
considered to be more important than liberty. That, of course, does
not mean that the text proves that the Framers thought that property was less important than liberty. The Framers could have
intended for deprivations of life, liberty, and property to be considered equally importaut, in which case the order of the words
"life, liberty, and property" would have been merely coincidental
and hence meaningless. Thus, while the language of the amendments seems to indicate that property is not more important than
liberty, the text does not prove that the Framers thought that
property was any less important thau liberty. The Court's capital
punishment and criminal procedure jurisprudence is more telling,
however.
Over the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has operated
under the proposition that "death is different."215 Since capital punishment, in its finality, is different from every other type of
punishment, the Court has required increased procedural safeguards
in capital cases.216 Additionally, the Court has instituted substantive
restrictions on the use of capital punishment. For instance, the Court
has forbidden the imposition of the death penalty on minors under
the age of sixteen217 as well as for those convicted of rape (of an
adult woman).218 Similar procedural safeguards and substantive restrictions do not apply to criminal defendants who merely face the
possibility of prison sentences. The Court's basis for the heightened requirements in capital cases is that a death sentence is a
more serious punishment than a prison sentence. Put more technically, the Court has concluded that the deprivation of life is more
serious than the deprivation of liberty.

215

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) ("Given that the imposition of
death by public authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases.
The need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due
the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases.").
217 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,838 (1988).
218 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-99 (1977).
216
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The Supreme Court's conclusion that life is more important than
liberty suggests that a hierarchy of rights does exist. As such, if life
is more important than liberty, it is plausible to suggest that liberty
in tum might be more important than property. The Court's noncapital criminal procedure jurisprudence supports and completes
this argument. Drawing on the Bill of Rights, the Court has created
a code of criminal procedure219 that affords unique procedural protections to criminal defendants. 220 For instance, the Court has
incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal
cases to be binding against the states,221 but has declined to do the
same for the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil
cases.222 Consider also the differing standards of proof required in
criminal and civil cases. The Court has mandated that a criminal
defendant can be convicted only upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt;223 conversely, a civil defendant will be found liable if the
plaintiff meets the less stringent preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard.224 The existence of these heightened procedural safeguards in criminal cases lends credence to the idea that there is a
hierarchy of rights and that deprivations of liberty are more important than deprivations of property.
This conclusion makes intuitive sense. In most cases, deprivation
of liberty is more stigmatizing than the deprivation of property; being sent to prison is viewed as more shameful than being ordered
to pay a fine. 225 In addition to shame, the incarcerated offender
usually suffers more than the fined offender. Although a defendant
219
See Hem:y J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53
Cal. L Rev. 929 (1965); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal
Procedure: First Principles 146-47 (1997) (explaining that the Warren Court created
"a remarkable doctrinal edifice of ... constitutional criminal procedure").
220 Interestingly, as noted above, increased procedural safeguards in capital cases
separate death-penalty cases from ordinary criminal cases and help to support the argument that deprivations of life are more important than deprivations of liberty. In
tum, the fact that ordinary criminal cases involve greater procedural safeguards than
civil cases supports the argument that deprivations of liberty are more important than
deprivations of property.
221 See D~mcan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968).
222
See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1876).
223 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
224 See James Brook, Inevitable Errors, The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil Litigation, 18 Tulsa LJ. 79,79-80 (1982).
225 See Hugo Adam Bedau, Death is Different: Studies in the Morality, Law, and
Politics of Capital Punishment 26 {1987).
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may struggle to pay a civil sanction, in most cases the fined offender pays the fine and moves on. The incarcerated offender,
however, must continue to live in an environment of restricted liberty, physical danger, and general discomfort until his sentence is
over.226 Thus, to put it simply, being deprived of liberty is worse
than being deprived ofproperty.227
Having established a plausible argument that liberty is more important than property, it follows that courts should afford more
rigorous proportionality review to criminal punishments than to
punitive damages awards. In other words, if it is more serious to
imprison someone than to fine him, then courts should expend
more resources to prevent disproportionate criminal sentences and
be less concerned about disproportionate punitive damages
awards.

C. The Political Process Theory Argument for Proportionality
Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments but Not
Excessive Punitive Damages Awards
While it makes sense to argue that liberty is more important
than property (and hence that criminal punishments should be
more rigorously reviewed than punitive damages awards), the best
argument for heightened proportionality review of criminal punishments comes from political process theory. The political process
idea, first articulated.by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in tQ.e famous
footnote four of United States v. Carotene Products Co.,m was
crafted into a prominent theory of judicial review by John Hart Ely
in his seminal work, Democracy and Distrust. 229 • The Carotene
Products footnote suggested that the Court would be deferential to
economic legislation but would carefully scrutinize individual liberty cases where a failure in the political process had prevented a
group's voice from being heard or where a law prejudiced a dis226 See Stuntz, supra note 21, at 24-25 (explaining that incarceration is a worse punishment than damages and that the former should be reserved for worse offenders).
m Of course, counter-examples can be imagined. For instance, a fine exceeding
one's assets is probably worse than one hour of incarceration. Nevertheless, in the
majority of cases it is certainly plausible to suggest that deprivations of liberty are
more invasive than deprivations of property.
228 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
229 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980).
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crete or insular minority. Ely developed this brief footnote into
what he termed a "representation-reinforcing"230 theory of judicial
review. 231
Ely's political process model calls for judges to stay out of the
substantive decisionmaking business (an area our democratic system leaves to legislatures) aud instead to concentrate on what
judges are most qualified to do: ensure proper process.232 In opposing substantive policy judgments by the judiciary, Ely posited that
courts should strike down laws under only three circumstances.
First, a law is constitutionally infirm when it unequivocally conflicts
with the text of the Constitution.233 The unambiguous constitutional
provision requiring that the President be thirty-five years of age
falls within this category; the vague Eighth Amendment protection
against cruel and unusual punishment does not. 234 Second, courts
should intervene when access to the political process has been cut
off. When "out groups" are cut off from the political process and
are subsequently disadvantaged by "in groups" that control the political process, it is the judiciary's job to intervene by clearing the
channels of political participation.235 Put another way, it is the judiciary's job to prevent the majority from suppressing the political
voice of the minority. Third and finally, courts should strike down
laws designed to prejudice discrete or insular minority groups, even
if the minority group had full access to the political process.236 The
prejudice prong calls on courts to protect those groups whose
needs and wishes legislatures have no interest in protecting.237 AI-

Ely, supra note 229, at 88.
Although his theory is largely based on the Carolene Products footnote, Ely
makes a case for political process theory based on the provisions of the Constitution
as well as American democratic history. See Raoul Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial
Review," 42 Ohio St. L.J. 87, 87 (1981) ("(W]here Justice Stone spun his footnote out
of thin air, Ely would root it in the Constitution."). For instance, Ely argues that the
Constitution is an inherently procedural document concerned with reinforcing democratic values and access to the political process. He explains that five of the eleven
(now twelve) twentieth-century amendments to the Constitution were concerned with
the franchise. See Ely, supra note 229, at 99.
232 See Ely, supra note 229, at 88.
233 See id. at 75-76.
234 See id. at 13.
235 See id. at 102-03.
236 See id.
237 See id. at 151.
230
231
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though Ely's theory has given rise to prolific and substantial criticism,238 it is nevertheless considered one of the most important
contributions to the theory of judicial review in the last century.239
1. How the Political Process Succeeds in Protecting Defendants
from Excessive Punitive Damages Awards
As will become readily apparent, the Court's proportionality jurisprudence does not conform to political process theory. Let us
begin with proportionality review of punitive damages. First, we
must ask if disproportionate punitive damages awards contravene a
direct and unambiguous constitutional provision. While the Supreme Court found in BMW v. Gore that excessive punitive
damages awards could be so unreasonable as to violate due process, substantive due process hardly constitutes a direct and
unambiguous constitutional provision.240 In fact, the idea that
courts should be able to reach out to the meta-text to discover a
238 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 231, at 88-89 (questioning the historical accuracy of
Ely's arguments and assumptions); Michael J. Klarman, Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 Va. L. Rev. 747, 782-88 (1991) (arguing that while the
"process" part of Ely's theory survives, the "prejudice" aspect of the theory fails because there cannot be a nonsubstantive theory of prejudice); Laurence H. Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063,
1064, 1072-77, (1980) (arguing that process-based models fail because at some point
proper process must be guided by substantive decisions, such as which groups are discrete and insular minorities); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The
Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 Yale L.J. 1037, 1051-53
(1980) (positing that it is often difficult to define who is the "out-group" or the "they"
in "we/they" process theories). Critics have been largely successful in attacking the
prejudice prong of Ely's theory because, even promulgated as a representationreinforcing idea, it forces the judiciary to make the same type of substantive judgments that Ely opposes. The process component of Ely's theory, however, has
weathered the academic storm. See Klarman, supra, at 748 ("My bottom line is that
the access, but not the prejudice, prong of political process theory has emerged relatively unscathed from the barbs of Ely's critics.").
239 See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of
Process Theory, 77 Va. L. Rev. 721, 721 (1991) ("Few, if any, books have had the impact on constitutional theory of John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust.").
w A more plausible argument could be made that excessive punitive damages
awards violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme
Court, however, has rejected such a challenge. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco
Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 263-64 (1989) ("Whatever the outer confines of the [Excessive
Fines] Clause's reach may be, we now decide only that it does not constrain an award
of money damages in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded.").
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fundamental protection ag~st unreasonable punitive damages is
anathema to the entire premise of political process theory; it
amounts to unelected judges making substantive decisions that
should be made by legislators.
Second, political process theory instructs us to consider whether
there has been a failure in the political process whereby an "out
group" has been cut off from the process and adversely affected by
a law (or, in this case, a lack thereof). To qualify as an "out group,"
victims of excessive punitive damages would have to contend first
that they did not have access to the political process, and second
that if they had had access they might have been able to pass laws
limiting or eliminating punitive damages awards. This "process"
challenge to punitive damages undoubtedly fails. Simply put, those
claiming that punitive damages awards are unconstitutionally excessive do not constitute an "out group." Victims of excessive
punitive damages awards cases are typically large companies with
unimpeded access to the political process. As such, they had access
to the political process, and the absence of laws limiting punitive
damages is not the result of a failure in the political process, but
rather a conscious choice on the part of legislatures not to restrict
the size of punitive damages awards.
Finally, defendants facing large punitive damages verdicts would
also be unsuccessful in contending that they constitute a discrete qr
insular minority whose interests have been ignored by the political
process. Defendants likely to be subject to excessive punitive damages verdicts are often large corporations with substantial capital.
In terms of success in the political process, "money talks," and it is
nearly untenable to suggest that large corporations with substantial
economic resources would be unable to find sympathetic allies in
the legislatures.241 Additionally, even if legislators were unsympathetic to the prospect of corporate contributions, victims of
excessive punitive damages verdicts could still find overwhelming
support in the general population. In the face of extremely large
punitive damages awards-such as the infamous $2.9 million punitive damages award for burns resulting from McDonald's
241 To the contrary, the charge is usually that substantial economic resources give
groups too much access to the political process. See, e.g., Charles Lewis, The Buying
of the Congress: How Special Interests Have Stolen Your Right to Life, Liberty and
the Pursuit of Happiness (1998).
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coffee242-the general public often perceives a tort crisis in which
punitive damages are out of control.243
The ability to gain the support of legislators through campaign
contributions, coupled with the support of the majority of the public, makes it inconceivable that victims of excessive punitive
damages constitute a discrete or insular minority group likely to be
prejudiced by the legislative process.
A cursory glance at punitive damages laws enacted across the
country in recent years demonstrates that those opposed to excessive punitive damages are anything but a discrete or insular
minority group .ignored by the political process. Not only have opponents of excessive punitive damages had access to the political
process, they have also had overwhelming success. No fewer than
sixteen states have enacted caps on punitive damages to protect defendants from excessive awards in all causes of action.244 For
instance, Virginia limits punitive damages awards to $350,000.245
New Hampshire has gone even further by prohibiting punitive
damages in virtually all cases.246 Other states have capped punitive
damages awards for specific types of claims, such as medical mal-

242 See Jurors Sting McDonalds for Scalding Coffee, Chi. Trib., Aug. 19, 1994, at 6,
available in LEXIS, Chicago Tribune File. Although it is not surprising that a $2.9
million award for hot coffee outraged the public, there are factors that make the verdict seem more reasonable. See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary
Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 717,731-32 (1998) (explaining that the plaintiff suffered third-degree bums, that the coffee was 20 degrees hotter
than the industry standard, and that the defendant originally refused to pay the plaintiff's medical expenses).
243
See Gregory Nathan Hoole, Note, In the Wake of Seemingly Exorbitant Punitive
Damages Awards America Demands Caps on Punitive Damages-Are We Barking
Up the Wrong Tree?, 22 J. Contemp. L. 459,461-62 (1996) (describing the hostile reaction to the punitive damages awards in BMW v. Gore and the McDonald's coffee
case).
244 See Ala. Code § 6-11-21 (1999); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102(1) (1999); Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 52-240b (1999); Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. § 768.73(1) (West 1999); Ga. Code
Ann.§ 51-12-5.1 (1999); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 512-1115.05 (West 1999); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 34-51-3-4 (Michie 1999); Kan. Stat. Ann.§ 60-3701(e) (1999); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 42.005(1) (Michie 2000); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 15-5.14 (West 1999); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § lD-25 (1999); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-11(4) (2000); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2315.21(D)(1)(a) (West 1999); Okla. Stat. tit. 23, §§ 9.1(B)-(D) (1999);
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.§ 41.008 (West 2000); Va. Code Ann.§ 8.01-38.1
(Michie 1999).
245 See Va. Code Ann.§ 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1999).
246 See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507:16 (1999).
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practice claims.247 Perhaps most n~tably, even Alabama, a state legendary for its exorbitant punitive damages verdicts248 (including the
$4 million award in BMW v. Gore), recently passed legislation capping all punitive damages awards.249 These statutes capping punitive
damages-particularly in Alabama, arguably the most pro-plaintiff
state in the nation-demonstrate that legislatures are able and willing to deal with the problem of excessive punitive damages awards.
In some cases, courts applying the BMW framework have run
head-on into these recently enacted punitive damages caps. A
Texas case provides a useful example. In Apache Corp. v. Moore/50
a gas well exploded causing property damage.251 A jury awarded
each of the three plaintiffs $562,500 in punitive damages, despite
finding ouly a few thousand dollars in actual damages.252 A Texas
appellate court originally upheld the verdict. However, the United
States Supreme Court vacated it in light of BMW v. Gore,253 and on
remand the Texas appellate court reduced the award. 254 What is
particularly notable is that in between the two appellate court decisions, the Texas legislature passed a law limiting the amount of
punitive damages that can be awarded in negligence cases like
Moore.255 The enactment of this punitive damages restriction dem247 See 40 Pa. Cons. Stat § 1301.812-A(g) (1999). Another common restriction is the
prohibition of punitive damages in tort actions against government entities. See, e.g.,
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-B: 4 (1999) (prohibiting the award of punitive damages
against a goverrunental entity for personal injury or property damage).
248 See David Firestone, Alabama Acts to Limit Huge Awards by Juries, N.Y.
Times, June 2, 1999, at A16.
249 See Ala. Code§ 6-11-21 (1999). The Alabama law, enacted in June of 1999, caps
punitive damages at the greater of $500,000 or three times the compensatory damages
in economic-injury cases and at the greater of $1.5 million or three times the compensatory damages in physical injury cases. When the defendant is a small business in an
economic injury case, the punitive damages are capped at the greater of $50,000 or
10% of the business' net worth. See id.
250 891 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Ct. App.1994), vacated, 517 U.S. 1217 (1996).
25t See id. at 674.
252
See id. at 678. In addition to the three plaintiffs at issue in this appeal, five other
plaintiffs were each awarded $562,500 in punitive damages, amounting to a total punitive damages award of $4,500,000.
253
SeeApache Corp. v. Moore, 517 U.S.1217 (1996).
254 See Apache Corp. v. Moore, 960 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). The Texas
appellate court reduced the punitive award to $10,820 for two of the plaintiffs and to
$21,700 for the third plaintiff. See id.
255 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code Ann.§ 41.008 (West 2000) (limiting exemplary
damages to either $200,000, or twice the amount of economic damages plus up to
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onstrates that the legislature was not only aware of the excessive
punitive damages problem, but was willing to fix it. In short, the
political process worked, and there was no need for the judiciary to
intervene.256
The evidence demonstrates that the political process can handle
the problems of excessive punitive damages without help from the
judiciary. Victims of potentially excessive punitive damages awards
have the resources to lobby politicians and affect the political
process. Moreover, the general public supports the movement to
cap punitive damages awards. As such, it is not surprising that legislation designed to prevent excessive punitive damages awards has
been successful in a sizable number of states. As we shall see,
criminal defendants cannot expect such favorable treatment from
the political process.
2. How the Political Process Fails to Protect Defendants from
Excessive Criminal Punishments

Political process theory demonstrates the need for rigorous judicial review of potentially disproportionate criminal punishments.
Arguments can be made that disproportionate punishments contravene a direct constitutional provision, and that criminal
defendants lack access to the political process that metes out their
disproportionate punishments. An even more persuasive argument
can be made that criminal defendants constitute a discrete and insu1ar minority group in need of the judiciary's protection. This
Note shall take each argument in turn.
Political process theory first questions whether disproportionate
criminal punishments directly contravene a provision of the Constitution. Arguably, the Framers intended the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to protect against disproportionate punishments. While "this argnment is certainly more
$750,000 in noneconomic damages, whichever is greater). Under the new statutewhich was not retroactive-the maximum punitive damages verdict for each of the
plaintiffs in Moore would have been twice the amount of their economic damages
(since there were no noneconomic damages); two of the plaintiffs could have received
a maximum of $5,410 in punitive damages and the third plaintiff could have received a
maximum of $10,820 in punitive damages.
256 lt is important, however, to point out that the Texas statute was not retroactive
and, without BMW, the excessive Moore verdict would have been upheld. The more
important point remains that the political process functioned properly.
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plausible than the idea that the Framers intended that the Due
Process Clanse of the Fourteenth Amendment provide substantive
protection against unreasonable punitive damages verdicts, it is not
clear that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was intended
to proscribe disproportionate punishments.257 While it is plausible
to argue that the Eighth Amendment should protect defendants
against disproportionate punishments,258 an equally plausible argument suggests that the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment"
proscribes only modes of punishment, not severity.259 With no clear
textual answer, it is impossible to conclude that strenuous judicial
review of disproportionate punishments is warranted. Thus, we
should next tum to see if criminal defendants have clear access to
the political process.
A credible argument can be made that victims of disproportionate punishments do not have unfettered access to the political
process. Because many convicted felons cannot vote, they lack access to the political process that is creating disproportionate
punishments. Specifically, disenfranchised felons are unable to access the political process to oppose recidivist ("three strikes and
you're out"260) statutes that lead to disproportionate punishments.
For instance, imagine a defendant who committed two felonies and
was incarcerated. After being released from prison, he was stripped
of his right to vote and could not vote against candidates who sup-.
ported a new "three strikes" bill that made the commission of a
third felony punishable by a sentence of life imprisonment. Subse257 See Ely, supra note 229, at 97 ("It is possible that part of the point [of the Eighth
Amendment] was to ban punishments that were unusually severe in relation to the
crimes for which they were being imposed.").
258 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1009-10 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is unreasonable to believe that the· Eighth Amendment was
intended to protect against excessive fines and excessive bail, but not excessive prison
sentences).
259 Justice Scalia advanced this position in his Harmelin opinion. Justice Scalia based
his conclusion on historical analysis dating back to the English Declaration of Rights
of 1689. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-85 (Opinion of Scalia, J.); see also Anthony F.
Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57
Cal. L. Rev. 839 (1969) (explaining that the American colonists misinterpreted English history to create a doctrine whereby the prohibition against "cruel and unusual"
punishment proscribes tortuous but not excessive punishments).
:uo For a list of states that disenfranchise ex-felons, see Alice E. Harvey, Comment,
Ex-Felon Disenfranchisment and Its Influence on the Black Vote: The Need for a
Second Look, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1145, 1146 n.6 (1994).
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quently, when the defendant committed a third felony he was sentenced to life imprisonment under this recidivist statute. Arguably,
the defendant's life sentence represents a process failure that merits the judiciary's involvement.
This argument, however, does not provide a particularly strong
justification for judicial review of all criminal punishments. Many
victims of disproportionate punishments are not recidivists, and as
such had the right to vote up until their conviction.261 Since their
punishments are not the result of process failures, an "out group"
challenge to disproportionate punishments is not particularly convincing.
Nevertheless, an extremely simple and convincing political process theory argument can be made that courts should engage in
rigorous proportionality review of potentially disproportionate
criminal punishments. Under the third prong of Professor Ely's
representation-reinforcing theory, criminal defendants constitute a
discrete and insular minority group that will be prejudiced by the
legislative process.262
In defining a discrete and insular minority, Ely explained, "The
whole point of the approach is to identify those groups in society to
whose needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest
in attending." 263 It is hard to imagine a group more fitting of this
description than criminal defendants.264 While some criminals can
261 See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1021 (White, J., dissenting). The crime that resulted in Harmelin being sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole (possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine) was Harmelin's first offense.
262 In making this argument, this Note is mindful that the "prejudice" prong of Ely's
political process theory has been roundly criticized by commentators. See supra note
238. This Note will make no attempt to defend the theoretical underpirmings of the
"prejudice" prong. Relying on Ely's original theory, this Note simply offers an argument that the victims of disproportionate punishments constitute a discrete and
insular minority group that will be prejudiced by the legislative process.
263 Ely, supra note 229, at 151.
264 See Stuntz, supra note 21, at 20 ("A lot of constitutional theory has been shaped
by the idea ... that constitutional law should aim to protect groups that find it hard or
impossible to protect themselves through the political process. If ever such a world
existed, the universe of criminal suspects is it."); Jelffiifer Buehler, Note, Hudson v.
McMillian: Rejecting the Serious Injury Requirement But Embracing the Maliciousand-Sadistic Standard, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 683, 715 (1993) ("Prisoners, by virtue of
their inability to vote and their physical isolation from the rest of society, represent
the quintessential 'discrete and insular minority' whose claims, under the Eighth
Amendment, should be heard and addressed by the courts.").
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vote, and while citizens can lobby the legislatures for reasonable
prison sentences, the reality is that legislatures often do not consider the interests of criminal defendants. In a "tough on crime"
political world, politicians do not win elections unless they announce that they will punish criminals severely.265 Subsequently,
elected officials know that they will not win re-electionsomething virtually every politician is interested in-unless they
maintain their "tough on crime" image by passing strict penalties
for criminal behavior. The need to be "tough on crime" does not
end there, however. Frequently, incumbents who have drafted
what could be considered proportionate prison sentences are nevertheless accused of being soft on crime by their opponents. As
such, the ever-escalating "tough on crime" rhetoric leads incumbents to pass even more severe sentences in order to avoid charges
from potential challengers that they are soft on crime.266 Since it is
almost unthinkable that a candidate could be accused of being too
hard on crime, there is little incentive for elected officials to stop
increasing penalties once they have reached a proportionate punishment for a particular offense.267 To a great extent, therefore,
Interestingly, Justice O'Connor has recognized the possibility of prejudice against
defendants, but only civil defendants. Objecting to the amount of discretion juries
have to award punitive damages, Justice O'Connor observed, "Juries are permitted to
target unpopular defendants, penalize unorthodox or controversial views and redistribute wealth." Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 43 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, while Justice O'Connor recognized the
problem of prejudice against punitive damages defendants, she did not point outeither in Helm or Harmelin-that excessive criminal punishments can also be the result of prejudice against nnpopular defendants.
265 For instance, in the 1998 New York Senate election, the candidates competed for
votes by claiming to be tough on crime. Democratic challenger Chuck Schumer
boasted that "Al D'Amato is not close to being as tough on crime as Chuck
Schumer," while Senator D' Amato, a Republican, responded, "It was Chuck Schumer
who ... voted against tougher penalties for dangerous criminals." Dao, supra note 19,
atBl.
71>6 One scholar contends that the war on crime and drugs has not been a response to
public concerns about crime. See Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and
Order in Contemporary American Politics (1997). To the contrary, Beckett argues
that politicians' "tough on crime" rhetoric itself generated the public's concern about
crime.
267 See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 47 Duke LJ. 1, 1 (1997) ("No politician in recent memory has
lost an election for being too tough on crime."); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
315 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (castigating the Court for conducting propor-
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penalties will remain severe and, at times, disproportionate. As a
result, unless there were to be a public backlash against these disproportionate sentences, something not on the horizon, criminal
defendants can expect little consideration from the legislatures.268
Thus, even if we eschew the argument that the Eighth Amendment was not intended to protect against disproportionately severe
criminal punishments, political process theory still provides a compelling reason for courts to scrutinize criminal punishments.
Elected officials have no interest in ensuring proportionate prison
sentences. To the contrary, legislators actually benefit from imposing disproportionate sentences because it euhances their image as
being "tough on crime." Since criminal defendants are a discrete
and insular minority that will be prejudiced by the political process,
the courts must protect criminal defendants from disproportionate
punishments.269
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's proportionality jurisprudence in the areas
of criminal punishments and punitive damages is backwards. The
tionality review of criminal sentences because "Congress has pondered for decades
the concept of appellate review of sentences and has hesitated to act").
263 The argument that criminals are a discrete and insular minority that will not be
protected by the political process is not new. Professor Ely recognized this when he
stated, "[I]f the system is constructed so that 'people like us' run no realistic risk of
such punishment, some nonpolitical check on excessive severity is needed." See Ely,
supra note 229, at 173. Justice Marshall has also embraced the prejudice argument.
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 377 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("In the
current climate, it is unrealistic to expect legislatures to care whether the prisons are
overcrowded ....").
269 By arguing that criminal defendants are a discrete and insular minority that will
be prejudiced by the political process, this Note does not mean to suggest that criminal defendants constitute a suspect class for equal protection or other purposes. See
Prisoners' Rights, 84 Geo. L.J. 1465, 1494 n.2975 (1996) (collecting cases holding that
prisoners are not a suspect class). Independent of suspect classifications, the argument
has been made that it is the judiciary's job to protect those who cannot count on the
political process for protection. See Susan R. Klein, The Discriminatory Application
of Substantive Due Process: A Tale of Two Vehicles, 1997 U. TILL. Rev. 453,489 (arguing that criminals can be viewed as politically powerless and in need of the
judiciary's protection without being viewed as a suspect class); Barry R. Bell, Note,
Prisoners' Rights, Institutional Needs, and the Burger Court, 72 Va. L. Rev. 161, 190
n.193 (1986) ("Prisoners ... are not perceived as a 'suspect class.' At the same time,
however, they are a peculiarly 'discrete and insular' minority poorly protected by the
political process, and thus require a measure of judicial protection.").
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Court has provided rigorous proportionality protection to punitive
damages awards while affording only curt proportionality review to
criminal punishments. The Court's jurisprudence ignores the reality that criminal defendants are in much greater need of the
judiciary's protection than those likely to be victimized by excessive punitive damages.
The legislative process is equipped to deal with the problem of
excessive punitive damages awards, and a plethora of laws have
been enacted to combat that problem. Those advocating limits on
punitive damages do not face obstacles in the political process nor
can they be construed as a discrete and insular minority that will
face prejudice and inaction from legislatures. Finally, since no clear
constitutional provision forbids excessive punitive damages awards,
the courts have no reason to intervene in this legislative domain.
Conversely, there is a sound reason for the judiciary to exert its
countermajoritarian weight in the criminal punishment area. Putting aside the plausible, though inconclusive, argument that the
Eighth Amendment was intended to protect against disproportionate punishments, as well as the plausible argument that some
criminal defendants were denied access to the political process because they could not vote, a compelling argument can be made
that, even with access to the political process, criminal defendants
constitute a discrete and insular minority that will face prejudice in
the political process. In a political world where winning elections
depends in part on being "tough on crime," proportionate punishments become an expendable commodity. Since it appears impossible
to lose an election by being too tough on crime, it is not realistic to
believe that the political process will adequately protect criminal
defendants, even those who vote. Since criminal defendants facing
disproportionate punishments cannot tum to the political process,
it falls to the judiciary to protect them from disproportionate punishments.
The Supreme Court must reconsider its decisions affording more
rigorous proportionality review to excessive punitive damages
awards than to excessive criminal punishments. Instead of protecting the beneficiaries of the political process, the Court should focus
on protecting those who cannot protect themselves.
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